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Abstract 
Chapter 1 explores the effects of international investment treaties on institutional quality. 
Capital importing countries use bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as a means to attract 
foreign investors who see these investment agreements as an effective tool to employ in 
case of an investment dispute. Several countries, often at the expense of their sovereign 
rights, have engaged in unbridled foreign capital competition, which has resulted in a 
massive proliferation of BITs since the 1990s. This chapter contributes to the debate over 
whether BITs harm the institutional quality (IQ) of signatory countries due to the 
possibility established by BITs of resorting to international jurisdictions to settle potential 
investment disputes. Using a panel of data from 132 countries over the period 1984–2012, 
this study suggests that BITs have no significant effects on IQ. However, the results reveal 
a significant positive effect of BITs on the IQ of Southern countries. While BITs do not 
significantly affect some IQ components such as corruption, law and order, quality of 
bureaucracy, government stability, and investment profile, I find that BITs have a positive 
and significant effect on the socioeconomic conditions of Southern countries. 
Specifically, I find that South-North BITs have a significant and positive effect on 
socioeconomic conditions in host countries. In contrast, I find no significant effects of 
South-South BITs on IQ. I conclude that South-North rather than South-South investment 
cooperation BITs are beneficial to Southern countries, by improving their socioeconomic 
conditions. 
Chapter 2 investigates some new determinants of investor-state disputes. In recent years, 
there has been a proliferation of disputes claims brought against investment host states 
by foreign investors, at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
xii 
(ICSID). This trend seems to be a natural consequence of the growing number of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) signed since the 1990s. This chapter seeks to further 
investigate the determinants of investor-state disputes by adding to existing analyses of 
claimants’ home state characteristics and exploring other factors such as trade agreements 
and export partners that could potentially influence the incidence of disputes. The 
research herein provides strong evidence that weak institutions and the stock of FDI 
inflows into host states are key factors in explaining investor-state disputes. Also, BITs 
are not the only pass-throughs of investment disputes. I found that trade agreements are 
also determinant factors of investor-states disputes due to the investment protection 
provisions embedded in these agreements. Also, lingering colonial ties that allow for 
greater economic exchange between former colonial powers and their former colonies 
constitute a channel for investment disputes. These findings confirm that institutional 
quality still matters and suggest that developing countries that are primarily capital-
importing countries via the signing of investment treaties could avoid unnecessary 
depletion of their scarce resources into international arbitration if they invest in improving 
their institutions. 
Chapter 3 analyses the effects of double tax treaties on tax revenues. The recent surge of 
cross border investments has raised awareness on the question of double taxation, making 
policies on profits taxation of Multinational Corporation more than ever relevant. 
Governments in many countries rely heavily on tax revenues for different purposes such 
as provision of infrastructures, functioning of public administration and other social 
services. Double tax treaties negotiated between two sovereign states aim to reduce or 
eliminate the burden of double taxation on the same taxpayer and for the same subject 
xiii 
matter. The literature on double tax treaties generally suggests that double tax treaties 
might be harmful to treaty partners especially when there is an asymmetry between 
countries in terms of flows of foreign direct investment. This chapter examines the effects 
of Double Taxation Treaties on Tax Revenues using a panel data of 37 countries over the 
period 1990-2010. Using fixed effect and system GMM methods, the results show a bell 
shape relationship between tax revenue and tax treaties. The findings suggest that 
countries signing tax treaties should expect at least two effects: a positive effect of tax 
treaties on tax revenues in the short run followed by a diminishing effect in the long run.
1 
Chapter 1: Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Erode Institutional Quality? 
1.1 Introduction 
Consider the legal environment in which firms operate in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Even 
though there are commercial laws on the books that govern the settlement of contractual disputes, 
courts are highly inefficient, costly to use, and potentially corruptible. Firms therefore rarely resort to 
them in practice. When Ghanaian firms were asked whether they would go to court following a dispute 
with a supplier or a client, fewer than 10 percent answered in the affirmative. 
(Rodrik, 2008) 
The popularity of BITs suggests that many investors are not confident about the legal and political 
environment in low- and middle-income countries. Given this fact, host countries believe they will 
benefit from signing a treaty that may seem on its face quite one-sided in favor of foreign investors. 
(Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, 2005) 
 
There is a growing consensus among economists that institutional differences are a major 
factor in explaining why some countries are rich and others are poor. Unfortunately, this 
has been hard to demonstrate empirically, as many scholars have adequately documented 
reverse causality running from institutional quality to economic growth (Lipset 1960; 
Knack and Keefer 1995; Hall and Jones 1999; Aron 2000; Chong and Calderon 2000; 
Rigobon and Rodrik 2005; Chang 2011). Political risk and institutional quality are among 
the factors that foreign investors consider when it comes to making an investment 
decision, especially in developing countries. It is no secret that in many developing 
countries, institutional quality is very weak and the enforcement of property rights is not 
a common practice. Indeed, a country’s institutional quality can influence the type of 
foreign investors who are attracted to that country. Hellman et al. (2002) found not only 
that countries with weak institutions attract a limited amount of foreign investment, but 
2 
that those countries only appealed to investors of lower quality with regard to the 
government standards exported. Given all this evidence of the importance of institutional 
quality, what do institutions really encompass? 
Defining institutions is challenging, as the concept is both broad and fluid. North 
(1990) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, as the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” He goes on to distinguish 
between formal and informal institutions; formal institutions include the rules created by 
individuals such as constitutions, while informal ones include conventions and codes of 
behavior. Their role is to eliminate any uncertainty that may hamper human interaction 
in society.1 Grief (2006, 28) defines an institution as “a system of rules, beliefs, norms, 
and organizations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior.” A central 
theme of Grief’s analysis of institutions, compared to North’s, is the incentives 
individuals have in society to follow rules, beliefs, and norms. The substance of his 
analysis is to examine why people follow rules, instead of just assuming that they do.  
The idea that investment agreements might affect the institutional quality of 
countries is part of a broad and controversial topic in development economics examining 
to what extent states can change or restrict their own behavior as a result of commitments 
to international agreements. Several researchers have investigated this question, but their 
findings have not produced a consensus. Downs et al. (1996) find that international 
commitments do not actually affect states’ behavior, but instead help identify those states 
                                                 
1 Furthermore, North (1991) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions.” 
3 
that are prone to comply. However, authors such as Abbott and Snidal (2000) think 
otherwise. The goal of this article is to shed more light on this important topic. 
The present article contributes to the debate about whether international 
investment agreements affect signatory countries’ institutional quality. The idea that 
investment agreements might influence the IQ of signatory countries can be first 
attributed to Daniels (2004), who proposed that BITs, by bypassing the domestic legal 
systems of developing countries, might negatively affect their quality of governance. The 
present study also extends this literature by accounting for (1) omitted variables such as 
legal origins and educational levels that are key determinants of IQ; (2) endogeneity 
issues that could have confounded estimates in previous studies, potentially limiting their 
findings; and (3) longer time series. In addition to expanding the period of investigation, 
this article is the first to explore the heterogeneous effects of BITs on IQ specifically for 
North and South partners.2 
 I employ the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) system to investigate the 
effects of BITs on institutional quality in the full sample and in the subsamples (North 
and South). I seek to answer the following questions: (1) Do BITs erode or improve 
institutional quality? (2) What are the effects (if any) of BITs on IQ in Northern and 
Southern countries, respectively? (3) What are the differential effects of North-North 
BITs, North-South BITs, South-North BITs, and South-South BITs on IQ? and (4) What 
are the effects of BITs on the components of IQ specifically? 
                                                 
2 I have defined Northern countries as the high-income OECD and EU countries. The remaining countries in the 
sample are referred to as Southern. 
4 
 These questions are of great importance, because treaty partners often have very 
diverse bargaining powers at the negotiation table when treaties are designed. An 
investment treaty signed between a Southern country and a Northern country may not be 
as binding or equally forceful as one signed by the same Southern country with another 
Southern country. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that BITs, if they have an effect at 
all, might have different effects on the IQ of countries negotiating a treaty, depending on 
the respective development levels or power of those countries. 
Using a sample of 132 countries over the period 1984–2012, I found that BITs 
have positive and significant effects on IQ for Southern signatories, specifically the 
socioeconomic component of institutions. Furthermore, the empirical results suggest that 
North-North BITs and South-North BITs have positive and significant effects on IQ, 
while North-South BITs and South-South BITs appear insignificant in this regard.3 
Overall, the findings indicate that BITs have improved the institutional quality of the full 
sample.4 An analysis of the effects of BITs on the subcomponents of the IQ index suggests 
that BITs have no significant effects on Corruption, Law and Order, Quality of 
Bureaucracy, Government Stability, and Investment Profile. The absence of significant 
effects of BITs on these components is robust to using alternative definitions of 
institutions. It is worth mentioning that the effects of BITs on IQ have been examined 
using a measure of the number of BITs signed based on their date of signature and their 
                                                 
3 “South-North BITs” refers to BITs signed by a Southern country with Northern countries; in other words, the North 
has an effect on the South. 
4 This result stems from the positive effects of BITs on the socioeconomic conditions of Southern countries, which 
represent about 71% of countries in the sample. 
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date of entry into force. The results suggest that BITs are effective in improving IQ after 
they enter into force. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents 
some background on investment treaties, and section 3 follows with a review of the 
literature on BITs in relation to institutions. The empirical methodology and the results 
are presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively. In section 6, I discuss the sensitivity 
analysis of the findings. Lastly, concluding remarks are presented in section 7. 
6 
1.2 Background on BITs and Theory 
Bilateral investment treaties are agreements established between two countries that are 
meant to govern investment activities between them. In other words, BITs are legal 
instruments signed between states that take on the force of international law and govern 
the rights and obligations of states that host foreign capital within their jurisdictions 
(Salacuse and Sullivan 2005). All BITs are structurally similar, but some contain more 
details depending on the requirements of the host country. A typical BIT is structured 
around the following concerns: scope of application, conditions for the entry of foreign 
investment, general standards of treatment, monetary transfers, operational conditions of 
the investment, protection against expropriation, compensation for losses from internal 
disorder, and settlement of dispute. 
 The role of BITs is twofold. The first is to promote a liberal investment regime. 
In fact, BITs can be perceived as instruments of a liberal investment policy founded on 
the three key principles of investment: neutrality, investment security, and market 
facilitation. BITs should then contain some provisions to reflect those principles 
accordingly. The second role of BITs is to serve as instruments of liberal legalism, 
because they support the rule of law. The establishment of the rule of law enacted by 
governments is intended to promote economic growth. It is well known that countries 
with good quality of governance, in addition to attracting more foreign direct investment 
(FDI), also enjoy better economic growth than countries with weak governance. For 
example, among East Asian countries, it has been shown that institutional quality is 
highly predictive of economic growth. Some authors believe that FDI is most effective in 
countries that have sound institutional frameworks. In addition, in capital-importing 
7 
countries, BITs help form the institutional framework, which is essential for reaping the 
full benefit of foreign investment (Kenneth 2010; Rodrik 1997). 
 It is worth noting that the roles of a BIT might differ depending on the contracting 
partner. For developed countries, the primary goal of an investment agreement is to set 
up international legal rules, along with enforcement mechanisms, to protect foreign 
investors against malfeasance by the host states. The second role is to create a competitive 
environment among capital-importing states that will induce other states to ease access 
for foreign investors. On the other hand, developing countries, in signing BITs, aim to 
promote and attract foreign investments by reducing the risks that potential foreign 
investors might face. Also, political and economic reasons may facilitate the signing of 
investment agreements. Even though signing BITs provides some investment security to 
foreign investors, there is still the risk that a country, even knowing the consequences it 
may incur, might yet for various reasons breach the signed investment treaty. This raises 
the notion of time inconsistency. 
 Guzman (1998) was the first to identify the problem of the dynamic inconsistency 
of bilateral investments treaties in relation to FDI.5 He argues that this problem represents 
a serious impediment to foreign investment and notes that, in the absence of an 
international agreement, countries are unable to commit themselves to legal rules. 
Investors, when undertaking an investment in a foreign country, incur at least two risks: 
an economic risk inherent to business activities and a political risk that might result from 
the interference of the government. Such interference is generally in the form of an 
                                                 
5 Also known as “time inconsistency,” dynamic inconsistency specifically refers to situations in which a “future 
policy decision that forms part of an optimal plan formulated at an initial date is no longer optimal from the 
viewpoint of a later date, even though no new information has appeared in the meantime” (Blanchard and Fischer 
1977). 
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alteration of the clauses of an investment agreement, or in an extreme case the 
expropriation of the business.6 Guzman (1998) argues that, on the domestic level, the only 
way to avoid dynamic inconsistency is for both parties to agree upon a private contract 
enforced only within the domestic jurisdiction. On the international level, investors might 
be reluctant to invest in foreign countries due to the dynamic inconsistency concern. The 
inability of sovereign states to credibly commit themselves to legal rules, and the 
possibility that these states might later change the rules once the investment is sunk, make 
it implausible that the parties might reach an optimal agreement. 
 The interests of foreign investors are best protected when an investment 
agreement is signed under international law. Even if the enforcement mechanisms under 
international law are weak, foreign investors prefer investments governed by international 
law to those covered by domestic private contracts. BITs appear, therefore, to be a means 
to mitigate the dynamic inconsistency problem in which the optimal policy ex-ante of the 
host-country government becomes suboptimal ex-post. Most governments want to protect 
their reputation and send good signals to potential investors (Guzman 1998). 
 Here, I will briefly address the theoretical justification for why international 
investment treaties might affect institutions. The literature generally distinguishes 
between two competing views on this issue. According to the first view, a commitment 
to international rules could serve to complement local institutions, at the same time 
reinforcing a state’s credibility both internationally and domestically in the eyes of 
                                                 
6
 Political risk is defined as “the risk that the laws of a country will unexpectedly change to the investor’s detriment 
after the investor has invested capital in the country, thereby reducing the value of the individual’s investment.” It 
includes the risks that a government will raise import or export duties, increase taxes, impose further regulations, or 
nationalize or expropriate the assets of the investor (Comeaux and Kinsella 1994). 
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potential investors. When a capital-importing country makes an international 
commitment, that sends a positive signal to investors, who see the signatory country as a 
business-friendly environment and a good destination in which to operate. This creates a 
competitive environment for foreign and local businesses that could improve the 
independence of the domestic judiciary system. But note here that this view makes the 
implicit assumption that domestic courts will comprehend and analyze all costs and 
benefits of the state’s commitment, so as to make some improvements domestically in 
order to remain competitive with the international court. The second view suggests that, 
for countries with a weak institutional quality, international commitments could serve as 
a replacement or substitute for domestic institutions, enabling signatory countries to 
remedy the disadvantages of their own institutions. However, the domestic courts of these 
countries will then have no incentive to improve their quality. 
Even when BITs serve to complement domestic institutions, they can still have a 
detrimental effect on local institutional quality. In fact, under international investment 
agreements such as BITs, foreign investors can bring investment disputes to international 
courts without first seeking settlement at the domestic court level, especially when they 
fear unfair treatment. As when BITs operate as substitutes for domestic institutions, BITs 
serving in a complementary role could degrade those institutions, leading to the 
stagnation of institutional quality, the effects of which might be more pronounced for 
countries with weak institutions. It is also possible that BITs can operate in both ways 
simultaneously in a country, with one approach annihilating or amplifying the effect of 
the other. In sum, these two views of how BITs affect institutions provide a theoretical 
10 
justification for the potential effects on institutional quality of bilateral international 
treaties. 
1.3 Review of Literature  
Regarding the determinants of institutions, La Porta et al. (2000) among others (Hayek 
1960; Beck et al. 2002) argue that the protection of foreign investors has differed greatly 
from nation to nation. They document that common-law nations have the most protective 
rules toward foreign investors, while the French civil-law countries have the least 
protective rules. Substantially, these authors find that countries with French legal 
traditions value states’ rights more than individual rights. In an intermediary position 
between these legal systems are the German and Scandinavian civil laws. Interestingly, 
the authors cited above note a high correlation between the quality of law enforcement 
and the level of development across countries. In more developed countries, law 
enforcement seems to be of a higher quality, but differing legal systems across a spectrum 
of countries affects more than just their political institutions. For instance, Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (2001) find supportive evidence that divergence in countries’ legal systems 
accounts for a great deal of variation in their financial institutions. Another important 
determinant of institutional quality is trade openness. Wei (2000) and Knack and Azfar 
(2003) have divergent views on the effect of trade openness on institutions. Wei (2000) 
puts forth the view that the willingness of countries to invest in building good institutions 
depends on their trade capability. He finds that “natural openness” is significantly and 
negatively associated with the corruption level.7 Furthermore, he stipulates that openness 
                                                 
7 Wei (2000) distinguishes between natural openness and residual openness. He defines natural openness as the 
portion of trade intensity (the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) explained by population and other 
geographic variables. 
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to trade requires countries to work on improving their governance quality. Yet, Knack 
and Azfar (2003) argue that greater openness can actually lead to more corruption. With 
respect to the quality of governance, Buss and Gröning (2009) find evidence of a highly 
significant positive effect of trade openness on governance quality. 
In addition, many scholars (Lipset 1960; Milligan et al. 2004; Rindermann 2006) 
find that education is positively associated with institutional quality. In fact, Lipset (1960) 
argues that the more people receive education, the more they are disposed to embrace 
democratic values and observances. Supportive evidence of the positive effect of 
education on democracy, civil rights, rule of law, and political freedom is provided by 
other scholars (Stouffer 1955; William 1978; Bobo and Licari 1989; Milligan et al. 2004; 
Rindermann 2006). Truex (2010) suggests that easy access to education can deter the 
tendency toward corruption in developing countries. 
Many other variables such as natural resources and ethno-linguistic fragmentation 
have been found to influence institutional quality. The link between natural resources and 
institutions is well established in economic literature. Sachs et al. (1999) point out that, 
due to poor political decisions, the abundance of natural resources in many countries is 
depleted through consumption instead of being utilized as a lure for investment. Norman 
(2006) shows that the nature of the effect of resource abundance on rule of law depends 
on the type of resource. A negative association is found between aggregate mineral wealth 
and rule of law. Several scholars in economics (Canning and Fay 1993; Mauro 1995; La 
Porta et al. 1999) have found that ethno-linguistic fragmentation—a measure of a 
country’s diversity—can affect institutional quality because the more heterogeneous a 
country is, the more likely it is to experience internal tension, especially when the country 
12 
boasts abundant natural resources. Table 1 presents a summary of the determinants of 
institutional quality as compiled from the economic literature. 
 A handful of previous papers that have examined the effect of BITs on the 
domestic institutions of host countries can be pointed out. To the best of my knowledge, 
Daniels (2004) was the first to put forth the idea that BITs may have a negative impact 
on domestic institutions. He argues that foreign investors prefer to rely on international 
institutions for dispute settlement, and therefore there is no effort on their part to engage 
in actions to improve local institutions. In an empirical investigation, Ginsburg (2005) 
compares the institutional characteristics of countries that adopted BITs in 1996 with 
some countries that did not sign any BITs. He found that countries with quality 
institutions are more likely to engage in bilateral treaties than those with weak 
institutions. Ginsburg then analyzed the impact of BIT adoption on corruption control, 
regulatory control, rule of law, and government effectiveness. He concludes that the 
ability of foreign investors to resort to international jurisdiction for dispute settlement 
may be detrimental to the domestic institutions of host countries. 
 A second empirical paper that has investigated the effects of BITs on institutions 
is by Sasse(2010). Using government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption as measures of institutions, he found that the adoption of BITs had 
no robust or significant effect on the quality of governance. This dearth of significant 
effects of BITs on institutional quality may be due to certain econometrics issues affecting 
the estimations. Specifically, the variable of interest and other control variables are 
potentially endogenous. Additionally, there are omitted variables in his specifications 
13 
such as education and legal origins that may affect IQ. Such econometrics issues are 
expected to bias the results and render inconsistent the coefficient estimates on BITs. 
 Also, one can argue that investment agreements could affect the institutional 
quality of host countries differently. This argument rests on the fact that Northern and 
Southern countries have different conditionality requirements when it comes to doing 
business with foreign investors. Countries such as China, Brazil, and developing 
countries more generally have low conditionality requirements for their economic 
relations with other Southern countries. For instance, China applies relatively lax 
standards such as low interest rates and lack of policy conditionality requirements when 
making loans to developing countries such as those in Latin America (Gallagher et al. 
2012). Because of its pledge of noninterference in the internal affairs of foreign countries, 
China has provided aid to some corrupt African governments such as Sudan and 
Zimbabwe that pay little attention to human rights and good governance, thus 
contravening Western countries’ efforts to encourage better governance in developing 
countries. In contrast, developed countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and 
other OECD countries have taken action either by enacting legislation or by imposing 
legal barriers to raise the institutions of developing countries up to their own standards, 
as exemplified by the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) and the UK Bribery Act 
(2010). Foreign investors consider all of these standards, in practice in Northern countries 
and to a lesser extent in Southern countries, when making investment location decisions. 
Foreign investors of Southern origin are believed to have certain advantages over their 
counterparts in Northern countries because of their familiarity with the markets in the 
South. This might explain the recent surge of foreign investment by Southern investors 
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in Southern countries (Azemar et al. 2012).8 These observations suggest that foreign 
investors from Southern countries have a “competitive edge” over their counterparts from 
developed countries in investing in developing countries, and one should naturally 
account for a heterogeneous effect in the North and the South when it comes to evaluating 
the effect of bilateral investment treaties on the institutional quality of signatory countries. 
 Lastly, to my knowledge no previous study has investigated the effects of BITs 
on socioeconomic conditions in signatory countries. But a few papers have studied the 
effects of FDI on related outcomes such as economic growth, poverty, and welfare, topics 
that are more generally measured using the Human Development Index (HDI) published 
annually by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Sharma and Gani (2004) 
published one of the earlier papers examining the effect of FDI on the HDI, finding a 
positive and insignificant effect in fixed-effect estimation on samples of low- and middle-
income countries. In the same vein, FDIs are most effective in improving HDI in 
developing countries that have: (1) some policy restrictions in sectors in which foreign 
firms can operate and; and (2) policy discrimination between foreign and local firms 
(Reiter and Steensma 2010). In the case of African countries, FDIs improve the HDI 
globally across the continent and at a various extent in regional blocks of the continent 
(Gohou and Soumare 2012). 
 South-North and South-South analyses of the effects of FDI on socioeconomic 
conditions in Southern countries have not been addressed by previous studies. This article 
aims primarily to investigate the effect of bilateral investment treaties on institutions and 
                                                 
8 Since around 2005, between one-third and one-half of total FDI inflows into developing countries were reported as 
coming from other developing countries (UNCTAD 2006). 
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also on different dimensions of institutions. And BITs can affect socioeconomic 
conditions through the foreign investment they attract. In fact, many scholars (Neumayer 
and Spress 2005; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2005; Rose-Akerman and Tobin 2005) have 
found supportive evidence that BITs increase FDIs in host countries. This article is the 
first to address the socioeconomic effect of BITs and to add South-North and South-South 
analyses to this study in developing countries. 
1.4 Empirical Methodology  
1.4.1 Model Specification 
Following Acemoglu et al. (2008), I have adopted the following specification for my 
benchmark regression analysis to investigate the effects of BITs on institutional quality. 
Specifically, I have: 
Instit = αInstit−1  + γCBITsit−1 +  X𝑖𝑡−1
′ β + μ
𝑡
+ ϑi+εit (1) 
The variable 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the institutional quality index for country i during period t, and 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged institutional quality variable. The dynamic specification is expected 
to capture the slowly changing and path-dependent nature of institutional development. 
The implicit assumption is that the past state of the institutional quality in a country 
influences its current state. 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 represents the cumulative number of BITs signed by country i during period t-
1. Using a cumulative number of BITs helps account for the deferred and lasting effect 
that BITs might have on 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡. The parameter of interest is γ in this specification. The 
economic reason for including the lagged BITs is in part to account for the institutional 
nature of BITs. The BITs variable is created using the date of entry into force rather than 
the date of signature. Also, it is more likely that the full economic effect of a BIT signed 
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in a given year will be spread over a number of subsequent years and not 
contemporaneously. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of control variables and includes GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$); 
Trade Openness, defined as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP; 
Education, measured by enrollment in secondary education; Natural Resources (rents 
from oil, natural gas, etc.) as share of GDP; and Total Population. A detailed description 
and definition of all the variables used in the estimations is provided in Table 8 in the 
appendix. 
Finally, ϑi represents a country’s fixed effects, while μ𝑡 denotes a set of time dummies 
capturing shocks affecting all countries’ institutions globally, and 𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
error term capturing probable omitted factors. 
Drawing from the review of literature on institutions and their determinants, I 
expect both GDP per capita and Education to be positively associated with institutional 
quality. Also, I expect natural resource dependence to have a negative effect on 
institutions. I expect a state’s legal system to be positively and highly significant in 
determining institutional quality. Regarding the effect of trade openness, there is no 
robust evidence. Some authors (Wei 2000, among others) find that openness has a 
positive effect in reducing corruption, while others think otherwise (Knack and Azfar 
2000). Likewise, no clear-cut causal relationship can be determined between country size 
and institutions. For instance, while Root (1999) and Fisman and Gatti (2002) argue that 
larger countries are more corrupt than smaller ones, Knack and Azfar (2003) argue 
otherwise. 
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As discussed in the previous sections, the main purpose of this study is to investigate 
whether investment agreements at the bilateral level have significant effects on the 
institutional quality of the signatory countries. There are two parties involved in this 
contract: the home country of the investor and the host country of the investment. These 
two countries, at the moment of signing these agreements, are at differing levels of 
development and have different bargaining powers. From that perspective, I postulate the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The overall effect of BITs on institutional quality depends largely 
on the concurrent BITs’ effects on the IQ of the subsamples (North and South) that form 
the whole sample. The resulting effect will depend on the direction (signs) and the 
intensity (magnitudes) of the BITs’ effects on those two specific country groups. 
Hypothesis 2: BITs are mostly initiated by developed countries, and these 
countries are mostly known to have good institutional quality; thus, one can reasonably 
assume that investment agreements will have from little to no significant effect on their 
IQ. On the other hand, BITs might have significant effect on the IQ of Southern countries 
because of their lower average institutional quality. Also, the effect might differ 
depending on negotiations between the treaty partners, due to their unequal bargaining 
power. The United States might affect a developing country’s IQ more effectively than 
China does. Therefore, North-North BITs, North-South BITs, South-North BITs, and 
South-South BITs are expected to affect institutional quality. 
1.4.2 Estimation Strategy 
To avoid the spurious regression problem, I first performed the unit root test in all time 
series used in the specifications. From the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
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Development (UNCTAD)’s website, I enumerated for each country the number of BITs 
signed in a given year. I assign “0” when there is no BIT signed in that year. The 
cumulative number of BITs is used in all specifications. I performed the unit roots tests 
using IPS (2003) procedure.9 The IPS test shows that all variables are I(1), that is, 
integrated of order 1. I then performed the KPSS test on the level and the difference of 
those variables.10 The results show that none of the variables are stationary in level, and 
that the differentiated variables are stationary. This makes the use of a differenced 
equation and dynamic system GMM appealing for the estimations. 
One natural way to address nonstationarity is to estimate equation (1) in differences, 
which gives the following specification: 
∆Instit = α∆Instit−1 + γ∆CBIT𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +  ∆X𝑖𝑡−1
′ β + ∆μ
𝑡
+ ∆εit (2) 
Many issues surround the estimation of equation (2). First, as pointed out before, all 
variables in the specification are nonstationary, while their first differences are stationary. 
Second, my variable of interest, cumulative BITs, and other control variables such as 
GDP per capita are potentially endogenous. With regard to the endogeneity of the BITs 
variable, it can be argued that it is the quality of a host state’s institutions that makes those 
states attractive to foreign investors in the first place. Moreover, once the investment 
agreements are signed and investors have invested in the host countries, the agreements 
may affect the domestic legal system by different means (corruption or other 
mechanisms). That is, there is a possibility of feedback effect between the BITs and 
                                                 
9 The Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) procedure allows for heterogeneity coefficients. It relaxes the assumption of a common 
autoregressive parameter and doesn’t require a balanced panel. The null hypothesis is that all individuals follow a 
unit root process, and the alternative is that some individuals follow a unit root. 
10 The KPSS test was developed by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992), who derived a way of testing 
the stationarity of a series based on the null hypothesis that the series is stationary, I(0) as opposed to the ADF and PP 
(Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillip Perron) tests, which test the null that the series is nonstationary, I(1). 
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institutional quality variables. The third issue is the slow-moving nature of the dependent 
variable, which is the institutional quality variable (see figure 2 in the appendix). To 
mitigate this issue, I explore different possibilities: annual data, five-year averages, and 
five-year lags (i.e., every five years). 
To estimate equation (2), I utilized the dynamic system Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).11 This method 
capitalizes on the fact that (1) lag two of institutional quality, Instit−2, is uncorrelated 
with the differenced errors terms ∆εit, which therefore constitutes a natural candidate as 
instrument for ∆Instit−1,; and (2) additional instruments are lag three and further lags of 
the institutional quality variable, because these lag variables are also uncorrelated with 
∆εit. 
The GMM estimator accounts for those instruments in the following orthogonality 
conditions: E(Instt−s∆εit) = 0 for t = 3, … , T  and 2 ≤ s ≤ T − 1          (3) 
Instt−s are the lags of the dependent variable instruments. As there is one more 
instrument in time t compared to t-1, the number of valid instruments increases 
dramatically with the time period T, leading to a finite sample bias. 
To circumvent those issues, I chose to estimate a system GMM that allows me to estimate 
equations 1 and 2 as a system. In other words, the level and the differenced equations are 
estimated simultaneously using the orthogonality conditions (3): 
                                                 
11 The Arellano and Bond estimators perform poorly if the autoregressive parameters are too large or if the ratio of 
the variance of the panel-level effect to the variance of idiosyncratic error is too large. Blundell and Bond (1998) 






















)  (4) 
The GMM estimation methodology rests on the assumption that the original error 
terms are unrelated. Therefore, we just test for first- and second-order correlation in the 
error terms, and the presence of correlation in the residuals invalidates the use of 
endogenous variable as instruments. It is recommended to reject the null of the absence 
of first-order correlation and to fail to reject the absence of the second-order correlation 
(Baltagi 2005). Also, because the number of instruments used in the GMM estimation 
explodes exponentially with the time period T, there is a possibility that these instruments 
overfit the endogenous variables. Therefore, it appears natural to test for 
overidentification. This is generally done by means of the Sargan Test using the J 
statistics of Hansen, distributed as chi-squared with the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments. The success of the GMM estimation is obtained by the convenient use of a 
tradeoff between the reduction of bias introduced by large instruments and the efficiency 
gain. 
1.4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I obtained the data on BITs from UNCTAD and gathered some of the control variables 
from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The data on institutional 
quality are from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 2012). This publication 
provides data on country risk over three dimensions—political, financial, and 
economic—for more than 140 countries during the period 1984–2012. In the context of 
this article, I have focused only on the political risk dimension, which comprises twelve 
components. Five of these components take values from 0 to 10, six of them range from 
0 to 5, and the last variable takes values from 0 to 4. The BITs data are the bilateral 
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investment treaties themselves concluded between countries worldwide during the period 
1984–2012. The choice of this time period is driven by the availability of data for the 
variables used in the different estimations, particularly data on the set of institutional 
quality components. 
Not all of the twelve components of the political risk dimension are relevant for the 
present study. Following previous papers (Knack and Keefer 1995; Chong and Zanforlin 
2000), I defined the institutional quality variable by taking the average of the six 
components most relevant to the context of this paper.12 These components are: 
government stability, which varies from 0 to 12, where 12 indicates lowest risk and 0 
means highest risk; investment profile, which varies from 0 to 12, where 12 likewise 
indicates lowest risk and 0 highest risk; and the socioeconomic profile, calibrated as the 
previous two components. The fourth component used is corruption, which varies from 0 
to 6 and measures the extent and risk of corruption in the political system. Next, I included 
the rule of law component, which also varies from 0 to 6, with a score of 6 indicating a 
very good system of law. The last political risk component I included in constructing the 
institutional quality index is bureaucracy. This component reflects the strength of the 
bureaucracy and how likely it is that policies will change following the advent of a new 
government. 
The choice of the six variables used to construct the institutional quality index is also 
supported by a principal component analysis. The eigenvalues’ table (table 10) shows that 
the first six components explain about 85% of the total variation in the data, while the 
                                                 
12These six components are those likely to be affected by international commitments such as BITs. The remaining 
components, which are not directly under the control of states, are more likely affected by some exogenous factors. 
The remaining components that are not accounted for in the definition of the institutional quality index are: Internal 
and External Conflicts, Military in Politics, Religious Tensions, Ethnic Tensions and Democratic Accountability. 
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eigenvectors table (table 11) shows that for each of the six variables used to construct the 
IQ index, when using the first six components, between 8% and 20% of the variation in 
each variable is left unexplained. Before averaging the six components of the political 
risk variable to define the IQ index, I normalized all these components to correct for the 
different ranges of values, using the formula x-a/b-a, assuming that x has [𝑎, 𝑏] for 
support.13 In doing so, I removed the scale effects of the six components retained, and I 
allowed each of these components to now range from 0 to 1. My final institutional quality 
variable is the average of the six components rescaled (multiplied by 10), ranging now 
from 0 to 10. A low score of the institutional quality variable is indicative of a highly 
risky country, and a high score for the variable reflects good institutional quality in that 
country. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables used in the present study for the 
full sample and for the subsamples of the North and the South during the period 1984–
2012. The mean values are reported, and the standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
The summary statistics are presented for annual data, five-year average, and five-year lag 
data. The sample countries here are those that signed BITs between 1984 and 2012. The 
selection of countries in the sample used in this study is determined by the availability of 
data on the dependent variable (institutional quality) and explanatory variables. For the 
annual data, the IQ variable has a mean of 5.66 with a standard deviation of 1.63 in the 
full sample, with a coefficient of variation of 28.80%. The Northern countries have the 
largest average IQ (7.33), while the Southern countries only have on average an IQ of 
                                                 
13 X is one of the six components used to compute the Institutional Quality Index. For example, the government 
stability component takes on values between 0 and 12. The normalization process of this component entails 
multiplying the government stability component by 1/12. 
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5.24. These figures clearly show that the North has an advantage in institutional quality 
compared to the South. 
The variable of interest is the (lagged) cumulative number of BITs signed by a country 
in year t-1. From the descriptive statistics of the annual data, on average, the cumulative 
number of BITs signed by a typical country in the full sample is about twenty during the 
period 1984–2012. The averages for the Northern and Southern countries are thirty-two 
and fifteen, respectively (see Panel A of table 1). However, in terms of average numbers 
of BITs signed annually, Northern countries have concluded two BITs (2.01) on average 
and Southern countries have signed about one BIT (1.06) on average. These figures are 
consistent with the stylized facts that: (1) BITs are mostly initiated by developed countries 
as a means to secure investments; and (2) most BITs are signed between developed and 
developing countries. In fact, according to the data collected by UNCTAD, most BITs 
(54.61%) are signed between Northern and Southern countries, while 32.59% of BITs are 
signed between two Southern countries, and only 12.80% of these investment agreements 
are concluded between two Northern countries. 
As for the other control variables, the average percentage of enrollment in secondary 
schools for the full sample is 69.26%. School enrollment is a function of the level of 
development, and 99.57% of all children of school age are enrolled in secondary schools 
in the Northern countries, while only 57.00% are enrolled in the Southern countries. The 
disparity in terms of level of development as reflected by GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US$) is striking; GDP per capita in Northern countries is, on average, $24,303, while for 
Southern countries the figure is $4,652. The North is less endowed with natural resources 
(1.90% on average) than the South (13.82%). Finally, the North appears to be more open 
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to trade (81.96%) than the South (78.79%). The control variables also include coastal 
distance and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Table 1 shows that Southern countries are 
more fractionalized (with an index of 0.52) than their counterparts of the North (Index of 
0.28). 
Note here that the summary statistics for annual data, five-year averages, and five-
year lag data presented in table 1 are very consistent and reflect similar patterns, at least 
regarding the control variables. The descriptive statistics suggest that: (1) wealthier 
countries have better institutional quality; (2) the mean values of explanatory variables 
for the two subsamples (North and South) seem to be proportional to their level of 
development, except for the natural resources variable for which Northern countries 
exhibit the lower mean value; and (3) there are few variations in the dependent variable 
(IQ), while most of the explanatory variables have high variation. In fact, the standard 
deviations of IQ vary between 1 and 1.6. The IQ as constructed takes on values between 
0 and 10, with a coefficient of variation of 28.8% for the full sample, 16.65% for Northern 
countries, and 25.11% for Southern countries. 
The takeaway from the summary statistics is that the coefficient of variations of IQ 
for each dataset shows that the five-year lag dataset demonstrates higher variation than 
the other two datasets (annual data and five-year averages). This observation indicates 






Table 1. 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: ANNUAL DATA  Panel B: EVERY 5 YEARS DATA  
  Full Sample   North   South    Full Sample   North   South 
  (1)   (2)   (3)    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Inst 5.66  7.33  4.98  Inst 5.60  7.33  4.90 
 (1.63)  (1.22)  (1.25)   (1.69)  (1.27)  (1.28) 
CV of Inst (%) 28.80  16.65  25.11  CV of Inst (%) 30.17  17.33  26.12 
             
(Cumul) BITs 19.97   31.82   15.18  (Cumul) BITs 16.84   26.93   12.76 
 (23.92)  (28.25)  (20.04)   (23.26)  (28.71)  (19.24) 
GDPpc05(10^3) 10.31  24.30  4.65  GDPpc05(10^3) 10.24  23.97  4.69 
 (14.40)  (16.37)  (8.46)   (14.31)  (16.28)  (8.58) 
EduSec 69.25  99.57  57.00  EduSec 68.96  98.78  56.91 
 (31.75)  (15.03)  (28.33)   (31.67)  (14.78)  (28.56) 
NatRes 10.39  1.90  13.82  NatRes 10.32  1.90  13.72 
 (14.33)  (3.27)  (15.60)   (13.94)  (3.23)  (15.12) 
Trade 79.70  81.96  78.79  Trade 79.69  82.97  78.37 
 (50.10)  (44.29)  (52.24)   (50.23)  (45.86)  (51.87) 
Pop (10^6) 42.3  26.7  48.6  Pop (10^6) 41.8  26.60  48.00 
 (141)  (48.8)  (164)   (140)  (48.6)  (162) 
dist_coast 0.31  0.21  0.35  dist_coast 0.31  0.21  0.35 
 (0.37)  (0.26)  (0.40)   (0.37)  (0.26)  (0.40) 
Ethnic 0.44  0.24  0.52  Ethnic 0.44  0.25  0.52 
  (0.26)   (0.18)   (0.24)    (0.26)   (0.19)   (0.24) 
Panel C: 5Years Average             
  Full Sample   North   South        
  (1)   (2)   (3)        
Inst 5.64  7.32  4.96        
 (1.61)  (1.20)  (1.21)        
CV of Inst (%) 28.55  16.39  24.40        
             
(Cumul) BITs 19.33   30.81   14.69        
 (23.57)  (28.05)  (19.70)        
GDPpc05(10^3) 10.10  23.73  4.59        
 (14.14)  (16.09)  (8.42)        
EduSec 68.14  98.87  55.73        
 (31.72)  (14.65)  (28.12)        
NatRes 10.28  1.93  13.65        
 (13.85)  (3.18)  (15.03)        
Trade 78.43  80.45  77.62        
 (48.60)  (42.48)  (50.88)        
Pop (10^6) 41.5  26.5  47.5        
 (139)  (48.3)  (161)        
dist_coast 0.31  0.21  0.35        
 (0.37)  (0.26)  (0.40)        
Ethnic 0.44  0.24  0.52        
  (0.26)   (0.19)   (0.24)        
 
Notes: This table contains the mean value of each variable over the period 1984-2012 and the standard deviations are in 
parentheses. The main dependent variable is the institution index defined as the average of the normalized six subcomponents, 
which are (1) Corruption, (2) Law and Order, (3) Investment Profile, (4) Quality of Bureaucracy, (5) Government Stability and (6) 
Socioeconomic Conditions. The explanatory variables used in the estimations are the lagged variables. The measures of institution 
are based on the ICRG data 2012. Each of the institutional variables are rescaled and takes on values from 0 to 10, with 0 (very low 




Figure 1 in the annex presents the fifteen countries that have signed the most BITs in 
the full sample, and the ten countries from both the North and the South that have signed 
the most BITs over the 1984–2012 study period. Of all the countries in the sample, China 
has the largest number of investment agreements (141 BITs), followed by Germany and 
Egypt with 98 and 97 BITs, respectively. Besides China, other Southern countries that 
are very active in signing BITs are Egypt (98 BITs) and Turkey (89 BITs). The remaining 
top fifteen countries from the full sample are dominated by Northern countries, led by 
Germany and Italy and followed by Switzerland, the Czech Republic, South Korea, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium. In the South, apart from China, Egypt, and Turkey, other 
countries that are very active include Indonesia, Russia, and Ukraine. The top fifteen 
countries from the full sample include some African countries as well. 
Table 10 in the annex presents the (unconditional) pairwise correlation matrix 
between the institutional quality variable and the explanatory variables. It also gives an 
idea about the expected signs of correlation among the dependent and explanatory 
variables. All the explanatory variables seem at first glance to exhibit the expected signs 
and have significant correlation with the dependent variable. Table 8 in the appendix 
presents the definition and sources of the variables used in this study. 
1.5 Empirical Results  
In this section, I present the estimation results of the system GMM equations (4) described 




1.5.1 Preliminary Results14 
The following results are based on a dataset constructed using five-year time intervals. 
Because the time dimension of the panel data covers twenty-nine years, from 1984 to 
2012, to determine the five-year time intervals I defined the starting time period as 
beginning in 1984 and the second as beginning in 1987, with five-year periods established 
thereafter. This approach yields a total of seven time periods in the final data set. The 
estimation results using five-year periods are reported in table 2.The results in table 2 are 
similar to those obtained with the five-year averages15. The coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variables are all comparable in terms of magnitude (relatively small values) 
and are all statistically significant. However, the control variables on the FE estimations 
are all insignificant. One plausible reason for this is the bias introduced in the estimates 
by the presence of the lagged dependent variable and the endogeneity of the variable of 
interest (lagged cumulative BITs). For the difference GMM results, the Sargan Test of 
overidentification is not passed, as the P-values are all less than the conventional values. 
Also, control variables such as Ethnicity Fragmentation and Natural Resources, even 
though significant, bear the wrong signs. This might be due to misspecification, or it may 
be a result of overidentification. In contrast to the FE and difference GMM results, GDP 
per Capita and Education appear highly significant in the system GMM estimations. More 
importantly, the system GMM estimation passed the validity test of second-order serial 
                                                 
14 In this preliminary analysis, I first undertook a Hausman test to see which estimation methodology, whether Fixed 
Effects or Random Effects, best fits the data. The test results are reported in table 14 in the appendix. 
 
15 In my attempt to overcome the slow-moving nature of the dependent variable (IQ) (see figure 2), I undertook the 
following approaches. I compared the estimations results of the five-year average with those of the annual data. In 
other words, I first investigated the effects of cumulative BITs on institutional quality using both annual and five-year 
average data for the full sample. The estimation results are reported in tables 12 and 13, respectively. 
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correlation (columns 5 and 6 of table 2). This means that there is no further serial 
correlation in the data when five-year lags are used. Of the three methodologies used (FE, 
Difference, and System GMM), System GMM appears to outperform the other two, as 
most of the control variables are significant and show the expected signs. Columns 5 and 
6 of table 2 shows that GDP per Capita, Education, English Common Law, German Civil 
Law, and Scandinavian Civil Law are all positive and significant in accounting for 
institutional quality. Additional control variables such as Coastal Distance and Natural 
Resources appear insignificant even though they bear the expected negative sign (see 
column 6 of table 2). Furthermore, Openness to Trade has a weak positive and significant 
effect on IQ. It is noteworthy that the variable of interest (the lagged cumulative BITs) 
shows an insignificant effect on IQ in the full sample despite the facts that most of the 
control variables are highly significant with the expected signs and that the validity tests 
passed. This suggests that further investigations are needed to uncover the probable 










Table 1. 2. Fixed Effect, Diff. GMM and Syst. GMM estimations, 5-year data 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t) FE Full Sample   
Diff GMM Full 
Sample   Syst. GMM Full Sample 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t−1) 0.3276*** 0.3290***  0.3744** 0.3855***  0.3786*** 0.3725*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0375)  (0.1480) (0.1460)  (0.0961) (0.1003) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) -0.0025 -0.0025   0.0244 0.0261   -0.0009 -0.0009 
  (0.0018) (0.0018)   (0.0200) (0.0190)   (0.0029) (0.0027) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0014 0.0013  -0.0012 0.0008  0.0392*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0092)  (0.0316) (0.0311)  (0.0102) (0.0094) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0005 0.0007  0.0260* 0.0265*  0.0147*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0021)  (0.0147) (0.0138)  (0.0044) (0.0049) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.1778 -0.1843  0.6280 0.6746  0.0248 0.0514 
 (0.3013) (0.3057)  (0.5595) (0.5483)  (0.0303) (0.0336) 
legor_uk       0.3616 0.6878*** 
       (0.2616) (0.1996) 
legor_fr       -0.0202 0.3351** 
       (0.2969) (0.1670) 
legor_ge       0.1669 0.5358*** 
       (0.2536) (0.1443) 
legor_sc        0.5227* 
        (0.3169) 
legor_so       -0.3020  
       (0.3157)  
Ethnic  -0.1211   1.2563***   0.1279 
  (0.1356)   (0.3696)   (0.2736) 
dist_coast        -0.1436 
        (0.0918) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)  0.0034   0.0134**   -0.0046 
  (0.0038)   (0.0067)   (0.0040) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)  0.0005   -0.0005   0.0018* 
  (0.0016)   (0.0022)   (0.0010) 
Constant 2.4947 2.4308     1.7729*** 1.7137** 
 (1.5185) (1.5857)     (0.6264) (0.6752) 
Observations 792 792  660 660  792 792 
R-squared 0.3675 0.3682       
# of country 132 132  132 132  132 132 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
AR(1) Test       0.002 0.002   0.000 0.000 








Instruments       14 17   23 27 
Notes: The dependent variable is the Institutional Quality Index constructed as the simple average of six of the political 
risk components provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Columns 1 and 2 give the FE estimation results; 
Columns 3 and 4 give difference GMM estimation results, and columns 5 and 6 give the System GMM estimation results. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.5.2 Effects of Cumulative BITs on Northern and Southern Countries 
The previous analysis has shown that lagged cumulative BITs have no significant effects 
on institutional quality in the full sample. This lack of BIT effects on IQ might be masking 
some heterogeneity in such effects, thus suggesting that the same question directed at the 
North and South subsamples might reveal some interesting results. I therefore split the 
initial sample into North and South subsamples based on host and home countries. In 
doing so, the goal is to test whether BITs affect institutional quality in the Northern and 
Southern host countries differently. 
 Table 3 reports the estimations results of the effects of (cumulative) BITs on IQ 
in the South. As stated earlier, no significant effect of BITs on IQ is found in the case of 
fixed effects. This might be due to the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable as 
well as of the variables of interest. However, the system GMM estimations seem to 
perform quite well. The system GMM results show that the English common-law 
tradition is a strong determinant of IQ in the South countries (see columns 3 and 6 of table 
3). Also, GDP per capita and education remain strong determinants, and additional 
control variables such as openness to trade have a positive effect on IQ as well. In light 
of the system GMM results, which best address the endogeneity issue evoked above, one 
can reasonably say that an effective additional cumulative BITs improves the institutional 
quality by about 0.6% over the short term in the Southern countries. But, in the long run, 
the cumulative BITs’ effect on the IQ of Southern countries is an improvement of about 
1%.16 
                                                 
16 The long-term effect is estimated by dividing the estimated coefficient of CBITs (𝛾) by 1 minus the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable (𝛼). 𝐿𝑅 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
𝛾
(1 − 𝛼)⁄  
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 I conducted a similar exercise for the Northern countries, for which I investigated 
whether BITs similarly help Northern countries improve their IQ. Not surprisingly, the 
results show no significant effects of (cumulative) BITs on the IQ of Northern countries.17 
In fact, it is less likely that an investment treaty signed between the United States and a 
developing country will have any significant effect on US institutional quality. This result 
does not indicate that developed countries such as the United States have already reached 
their institutional quality frontier or maximum level of IQ; it only indicates that the effect 
of investment treaties on the IQ of developed countries is nonexistent. Tables 3 and 4 
clearly indicate that the system GMM appears more appropriate for estimating the effects 
of cumulate BITs on institutional quality. For the remainder of this article, I will 
exclusively rely on system GMM methodology for my estimations. 
 As a next step, I analyzed whether the positive effects of BITs on the IQ of 
Southern countries are conditional on the nature of the investment agreement. 
Specifically, I explored the following question: do North-North BITs, North-South BITs, 






















                                                 
17 To save space, I do not report the results when the effects of BITs are not significant. 
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Table 1. 3 Effect of BITs on Institutions of Southern Countries, 5-year data 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t) 
Syst. GMM, Southern Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t−1) 0.3278** 0.3227** 0.3196** 0.3174** 0.3168** 0.3010** 
 (0.1368) (0.1379) (0.1367) (0.1393) (0.1374) (0.1390) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) 0.0063** 0.0059* 0.0061** 0.0060** 0.0057** 0.0052* 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0366** 0.0372** 0.0360** 0.0388** 0.0350*** 0.0366** 
 (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0162) (0.0133) (0.0144) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0054*** 0.0050** 0.0056*** 0.0055*** 0.0048*** 0.0050** 
 (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0021) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0060 -0.0077 0.0023 -0.0059 0.0249 0.0323 
 (0.0327) (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0384) (0.0384) 
legor_uk 0.3016 0.3239 0.5004*** 0.2995 0.2907 0.3494*** 
 (0.2508) (0.2511) (0.1239) (0.2598) (0.2627) (0.1277) 
legor_fr -0.1193 -0.1040 0.0818 -0.1158 -0.0669 0.0010 
 (0.2451) (0.2407) (0.1014) (0.2525) (0.2590) (0.1233) 
legor_so -0.1535 -0.1007  -0.1742 -0.0086  
 (0.2215) (0.2311)  (0.2339) (0.2471)  
legor_ge   0.3090   0.1494 
   (0.2975)   (0.3281) 
Ethnic  -0.1753    0.0001 
  (0.2787)    (0.2575) 
dist_coast   -0.1508   -0.1207 
   (0.1416)   (0.1239) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)    -0.0029  -0.0027 
    (0.0044)  (0.0045) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)     0.0030** 0.0030** 
     (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Constant 2.4502*** 2.5567*** 2.3694*** 2.5232*** 2.4503*** 2.5490*** 
 (0.6541) (0.7013) (0.5992) (0.6841) (0.6515) (0.6876) 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 
# of Country 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
AR(2) Test  0.323 0.314 0.309 0.3 0.249 0.223 
Sargan (P-value) 0.510 0.515 0.518 0.513 0.530 0.540 
Instruments 22 23 23 23 23 26 
Notes: The dependent variable is the Institutional Quality Index constructed as the simple average of six of the political 
risk components provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The variable of interest,𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1), is the  
cumulative number of BITs signed by a country at time (t-1). The legal origin variables are:  legor_uk which refers to 
English legal origin, legor_fr is the French legal origin, legor_so is the Socialist legal origin and legor_ge is the German  
legal origin. 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to Natural Resources and 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) is Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast 
refers to the coastal distance. The variableEthnic refers to Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation.  






1.5.3 Effects of Decomposed BITs on Institutional Quality 
In this section, I will analyze the effects of the decomposed BITs (i.e., North-North, 
North-South, South-North, and South-South) on IQ using the full sample as well as the 
North and South subsamples. As a reminder, South-North BITs reflect the effect that the 
North exerts on the institutions of Southern countries. I first estimated the effects of 
decomposed cumulative BITs on IQ using the full sample, but the (unreported) results 
are not reliable because the validity test of the second order serial correlation failed. 
 I then looked at the effects of decomposed BITs on the IQ of Southern countries. 
Note here that the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are weakly significant 
and have smaller magnitudes. This indicates a very weak inertia in the institutions of 
Southern countries (see table 4). Overall, the results show a positive, weak, and 
significant effect of BITs on institutions. I also note that, in this case, the AR(2) test 
passed. The key control variables GDP per Capita, Education, and Legal Origin dummies 
are all significant and consistent as expected. Column (1) reports the results of the 
baseline model. In the following, columns, (2) to (5), I report additional results when 
additional controls are added one at a time to the baseline model. In column (6), I report 
the estimation results when I controlled for all the explanatory variables. Except for 
Openness to Trade, the additional control variables (Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation, 
Coastal Distance, and Natural Resources) all appear insignificant, but they bear the 
expected signs. Openness to trade has a positive and significant effect on IQ (see columns 
5 and 6). 
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 More importantly, the results also reveal that South-North BITs have a weak and 
positive effect on institutions, while South-South BITs have effects on IQ that are 
insignificant and marginal. Control variables such as GDP per Capita, Education, and 
British Legal Origin are key determinants of IQ in the South subsample. The positive 
effect of South-North BITs (i.e., the effect of the North on the South) on the IQ of 
Southern countries is not consistently significant across specifications. Even though, in 
the last three columns, the effects are insignificant, these findings seem to suggest that 
South-North investment cooperation appears preferable for Southern countries in terms 
of improvement of their institutional quality. However, the same exercise conducted in 
the North subsample shows that neither the North-North BITs nor the North-South BITs 
appear to have any significant effects on the IQ of Northern countries. These findings 
might only be reflecting the fact that Northern countries have better IQ to begin with, so 
the effects of BITs and disaggregated BITs on their IQ are insignificant or nonexistent. 
The insignificant effects of North-South BITs should not come as a surprise. It is unlikely, 
for instance, that an investment agreement between the United States and a developing 
country such as Ghana will have any effect on US institutions. The weak effects of South-
North BITs on IQ might be due to the fact that not all the six components of the IQ index 
react in the same manner to the investment agreements. For instance, some components, 
such as corruption, might not be very responsive, while others are. The effect of BITs on 
corruption is unclear, as is the effect of FDI on corruption. In fact, foreign firms may deal 
with corruption in host countries where they are investing in one way, while the host 
government, in an effort to attract foreign investment, might address its homegrown 
corruption in an entirely different way. Therefore, an investigation of the effects of 
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Table 1. 4 Effect of Decomposed BITs on Institutions, 5-year data, Southern 
Countries 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑡) 
Syst. GMM, Southern Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑡−1) 0.3116** 0.3057* 0.3007* 0.2958* 0.2997* 0.2766* 
 (0.1561) (0.1578) (0.1562) (0.1644) (0.1579) (0.1653) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑁  0.0163* 0.0148* 0.0163* 0.0141 0.0142 0.0121 
  (0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0094) (0.0087) (0.0097) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑆  0.0014 0.0015 0.0010 0.0022 0.0016 0.0021 
 (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0062) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0381** 0.0387** 0.0376** 0.0402** 0.0364** 0.0378** 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0163) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0050** 0.0047* 0.0052** 0.0052** 0.0044** 0.0048** 
 (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0082 -0.0095 0.0007 -0.0073 0.0249 0.0343 
 (0.0338) (0.0340) (0.0338) (0.0343) (0.0405) (0.0409) 
legor_uk 0.4226*** 0.3986*** 0.4701*** 0.4462*** 0.2635** 0.3228** 
 (0.1361) (0.1418) (0.1434) (0.1526) (0.1192) (0.1366) 
legor_fr -0.0133 -0.0439 0.0352 0.0110 -0.1046 -0.0406 
 (0.0968) (0.1147) (0.1059) (0.0981) (0.1043) (0.1206) 
legor_ge 0.1073 0.0635 0.2712 0.1334 -0.0394 0.1222 
 (0.2409) (0.2473) (0.3157) (0.2566) (0.2576) (0.3415) 
Ethnic  -0.1623    0.0142 
  (0.2865)    (0.2694) 
dist_coast   -0.1601   -0.1343 
   (0.1471)   (0.1306) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)    -0.0022  -0.0022 
    (0.0047)  (0.0049) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)     0.0031** 0.0032** 
     (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Constant 2.3813*** 2.5558*** 2.4757*** 2.4739*** 2.4902*** 2.6743*** 
 (0.7417) (0.8425) (0.7387) (0.7963) (0.7684) (0.7573) 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 
# of country 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.014 




0.931 0.928 0.933 0.937 
Instruments 24 25 25 25 25 28 
Notes:The dependent variable is the Institutional Quality Index constructed as the simple average of six of the political 
risk components provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).. The variables of interest are now𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑁  
which captures the effects of North on South and 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑆  which captures the effects of South on South.  
The legal origin variables are:  legor_uk which refers to English legal origin, legor_fr is the French legal origin, legor_so 
is the Socialist legal origin and legor_ge is the German legal origin. 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to Natural Resources and  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1)is Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast refers to the coastal distance. The variableEthnic refers 
toEthnolinguistic Fragmentation.  







1.5.4 Effects of BITs and Decomposed BITs on the Components of Institutions 
In this section, I look at the possible effects of cumulative BITs, North-North BITs, 
North-South BITs, South-North BITs, and South-South BITs on the components of IQ 
for the full sample and the two subsamples (North and South).18 
 The results reported in Table 5 suggest that BITs have an overall positive effect 
on socioeconomic conditions in the full sample. It is worth recalling that the 
socioeconomic conditions component of the IQ index I use is made up of three 
subcomponents, namely unemployment, consumer confidence, and poverty. These 
findings indicate that BITs have a positive impact on host countries by creating jobs, 
boosting consumer confidence, and reducing poverty. The results should not come as a 
surprise, as most studies have found that BITs, by attracting FDI, in turn generate positive 
spillovers in the recipient countries, especially in the South. 
 I conducted a similar analysis in Southern countries, and the findings confirm the 
aforementioned results. As with the full sample, the results reported in Table 6 suggest 
that cumulative BITs also have significant effects on the socioeconomic conditions of 
Southern countries, as expected. The significant effects seen in the full sample must be 
due to such effects occurring specifically in the Southern component of the full sample. 
Once again, these results suggest that BITs have positive effects on job creation and 
poverty reduction in the Southern countries, which is consistent with the results obtained 
                                                 
18 The components of institutional quality that I used are: Corruption, Law and Order, Quality of Bureaucracy, 
Government Stability, Investment Profile, and Socioeconomic Conditions. 
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by Adams (2009) and Gohou and Soumare (2011), who found that FDI flows have a 
positive impact on growth and poverty reduction in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa. 
 I conducted a similar exercise on the five other components of the IQ index. The 
results show no significant effect of BITs on corruption, quality of bureaucracy, law and 
order, investment profile, or government stability (appendix, table 17). For government 
stability, I note a negative and significant effect, but the model does not seem to perform 
very well, as all other control variables are insignificant. Of the six variables on which 
the effects of BITs were tested, only the socioeconomic conditions variable appears to 
react significantly and consistently across specifications. Thus, in the next section, I 
explore the effects of different directions of investment treaties on the institutional quality 


















Table 1. 5 Effect of BITs on Socioeconomic Conditions, 5-year data, Full Sample 
 
𝑆𝐶(𝑡) 
Syst. GMM,  Full Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑆𝐶(𝑡−1) 0.2845** 0.2799** 0.2711** 0.2836** 0.2848** 0.2709** 
 (0.1228) (0.1228) (0.1222) (0.1232) (0.1212) (0.1207) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) 0.0238*** 0.0231*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0230*** 0.0227*** 
  (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0043) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0493*** 0.0497*** 0.0488*** 0.0494*** 0.0486*** 0.0484*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0104) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0080*** 0.0069*** 0.0081*** 0.0080*** 0.0078*** 0.0073*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0026) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0711* -0.0769* -0.0527 -0.0719* -0.0423 -0.0286 
 (0.0408) (0.0414) (0.0409) (0.0408) (0.0471) (0.0491) 
legor_uk 0.6402*** 0.7456*** 0.6352*** 0.6473*** 0.4787*** 0.5365*** 
 (0.2165) (0.2373) (0.2173) (0.2180) (0.1638) (0.1897) 
legor_fr 0.2435 0.3338 0.2324 0.2526 0.1114 0.1541 
 (0.1917) (0.2078) (0.1917) (0.1920) (0.1027) (0.1405) 
legor_ge 0.1417 0.2060 0.1664 0.1435 0.0015 0.0661 
 (0.2188) (0.2259) (0.2157) (0.2183) (0.1776) (0.2001) 
legor_so 0.0769 0.2471 -0.0336 0.0785   
 (0.2097) (0.2576) (0.2178) (0.2094)   
legor_sc     -0.0618 -0.0551 
     (0.2152) (0.2791) 
Ethnic  -0.3582    -0.2005 
  (0.3126)    (0.3185) 
dist_coast   -0.3274**   -0.2990** 
   (0.1510)   (0.1448) 
NatRes_1    -0.0010  0.0005 
    (0.0051)  (0.0054) 
Trade_1     0.0020 0.0019 
     (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Constant 0.4858 0.6555 0.7426 0.4980 0.6160 2.1525*** 
 (0.4617) (0.5008) (0.4938) (0.4730) (0.4450) (0.6347) 
Observations 792 792 792 792 792 792 
# of country 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 




0.228 0.207 0.212 0.233 
Instruments 23 24 24 24 24 27 
Notes: The dependent variable is Socioeconomic Conditions provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
The variable of interest,𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) is the cumulative number of BITs signed by a country at time (t-1). The legal origin 
variables are:  legor_uk which refers to English legal origin, legor_fr is the French legal origin, legor_so is the Socialist 
legal origin and legor_ge is the German legal origin. 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to Natural Resources and 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) is  
Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast refers to the coastal distance. The variableEthnic refers to Ethnolinguistic 









Syst. GMM,  Full Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑆𝐶(𝑡−1) 0.3792*** 0.3745*** 0.3683*** 0.3782*** 0.3770*** 0.3649*** 
 (0.1144) (0.1143) (0.1138) (0.1148) (0.1139) (0.1136) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑁  0.0571*** 0.0566*** 0.0562*** 0.0569*** 0.0562*** 0.0552*** 
  (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0139) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑆  0.0029 0.0022 0.0028 0.0026 0.0028 0.0025 
  (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑁  0.0415*** 0.0395** 0.0432*** 0.0408** 0.0395** 0.0403** 
  (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0162) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑆  0.0196 0.0200 0.0190 0.0200 0.0195 0.0191 
  (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0120) (0.0122) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0510*** 0.0514*** 0.0506*** 0.0512*** 0.0504*** 0.0502*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0110) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0057** 0.0048* 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0057** 0.0052** 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0566 -0.0613* -0.0398 -0.0575 -0.0357 -0.0226 
 (0.0358) (0.0362) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0422) (0.0437) 
legor_uk 0.7025*** 0.7927*** 0.6947*** 0.4926** 0.4240** 0.4909** 
 (0.2250) (0.2391) (0.2256) (0.1981) (0.1836) (0.2042) 
legor_fr 0.3657* 0.4438** 0.3529* 0.1589 0.1073 0.1625 
 (0.2070) (0.2154) (0.2063) (0.1342) (0.1203) (0.1509) 
legor_ge 0.1452 0.2006 0.1752 -0.0696 -0.1204 -0.0354 
 (0.2261) (0.2320) (0.2227) (0.2015) (0.2041) (0.2162) 
legor_so 0.2201 0.3589 0.1114    
 (0.2396) (0.2664) (0.2478)    
legor_sc    -0.2188 -0.2058 -0.1762 
    (0.2407) (0.2426) (0.2869) 
Ethnic  -0.3021    -0.1530 
  (0.2753)    (0.2803) 
dist_coast   -0.3155**   -0.2911** 
   (0.1402)   (0.1334) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)    -0.0012  0.0002 
    (0.0046)  (0.0049) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)     0.0014 0.0014 
     (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Constant 0.1040 0.2494 0.3385 0.3356 0.3719 0.6288 
 (0.4422) (0.4791) (0.4744) (0.4242) (0.4276) (0.5386) 
Observations 792 792 792 792 792 792 
# of country 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




0.514 0.495 0.497 0.516 
Instruments 28 29 29 29 29 32 
Notes: The dependent variable is Socioeconomic Conditions provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
The variable of interest,𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) is now split into 4 components: 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑁  captures the effect of North on North, 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑁𝑆 captures the effect of South on North, 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑁   captures the effects of North on South,𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑆  
captures of South on South. The legal origin variables are:  legor_uk which refers to English legal origin, legor_fr is the 
French legal origin, legor_so is the Socialist legal origin and legor_ge is the German legal origin. 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to  
Natural Resources and 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) is Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast refers to the coastal distance. 
The variableEthnic refers to Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation.  






Table 1. 7 Effect of Decomposed CBITs on Socioeconomic Conditions, 5-year data, 
Southern Countries 
𝑆𝐶(𝑡) 
Syst. GMM,  Southern Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑆𝐶(𝑡−1) 0.6189*** 0.6182*** 0.6102*** 0.6197*** 0.6136*** 0.6077*** 
 (0.1516) (0.1514) (0.1502) (0.1541) (0.1492) (0.1505) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑁  0.0620*** 0.0619*** 0.0622*** 0.0635*** 0.0608*** 0.0641*** 
  (0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0164) (0.0149) (0.0161) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑆  0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0006 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0128) (0.0117) (0.0119) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0369** 0.0369** 0.0363** 0.0357** 0.0360** 0.0334** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0171) (0.0156) (0.0161) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0015 0.0011 0.0016 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0025) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0518 -0.0517 -0.0414 -0.0520 -0.0334 -0.0196 
 (0.0354) (0.0357) (0.0346) (0.0358) (0.0381) (0.0391) 
legor_uk 0.1465 0.1485 0.2058 0.1294 0.5698** 0.1247 
 (0.1825) (0.1921) (0.1895) (0.1948) (0.2400) (0.1973) 
legor_fr -0.0121 -0.0101 0.0520 -0.0380 0.4505** 0.0050 
 (0.1095) (0.1201) (0.1169) (0.1258) (0.2152) (0.1402) 
legor_ge -0.4282* -0.4250* -0.2298 -0.4486**  -0.2668 
 (0.2223) (0.2304) (0.2773) (0.2280)  (0.2955) 
legor_so     0.5111**  
     (0.2368)  
Ethnic  0.0096    0.1330 
  (0.2338)    (0.2464) 
dist_coast   -0.1955   -0.2317* 
   (0.1466)   (0.1376) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)    0.0021  0.0026 
    (0.0044)  (0.0046) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)     0.0018 0.0018 
     (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Constant 0.8883 0.8833 0.9727* 0.8855 -0.4356 0.0127 
 (0.5624) (0.5823) (0.5676) (0.5689) (0.5165) (0.5082) 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 
# of Country 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




0.617 0.604 0.615 0.615 
Instruments 24 25 25 25 25 28 
Notes:The dependent variable is Socioeconomic conditions provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
The variables of interest are now𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑁  which captures the effects of North on South and 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1)
𝑆𝑆  which  
captures the effects of South on South. The legal origin variables are:  legor_uk which refers to English legal origin,  
legor_fr is the French legal origin, legor_so is the Socialist legal origin and legor_ge is the German legal origin. 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to Natural Resources and 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) is Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast refers to 
the coastal distance. The variableEthnic refersto Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation.  






My analysis, in terms of the effects of decomposed BITs (South-North BITs and South-
South BITs), shows no significant effects of South-South BITs on the socioeconomic 
conditions in Southern countries, whereas South-North BITs appear to have positive and 
highly significant effects (at the 1% level). The lack of significance of South-South BITs 
could be interpreted as the ineffectiveness of South-South investment cooperation in 
significantly improving the overall socioeconomic conditions of Southern countries. 
Therefore, South-North investment cooperation seems more beneficial for Southern 
countries than South-South ones. A plausible explanation might be found in the nature of 
the provisions embedded in South-South BITs, compared to the provisions of South-
North BITs. This finding is consistent with Poulsen (2010), who noted that South-North 
BITs are more comprehensive than South-South BITs with respect to their scope. More 
importantly, Poulsen (2010) showed that South-South BITs and South-North BITs 
systematically differ in two provisions, National Treatment and Transfer of Funds.19 He 
concluded that administrators in developing countries, in their pursuit of developmental 
objectives, tend to soften the rules more than their counterparts in developed countries. 
The relatively noncoercive nature of South-South BITs might explain the recent 
proliferation of such agreements among southern countries. In fact, according to 
interviews conducted in several developing countries, officials view BITs as merely a 
framework rather than a forceful treaty (Poulsen 2010, 126).20 The differing 
                                                 
19 The clauses of the National Treatment provision state that foreign investors and their investments are accorded 
treatment no less favorable than that which the host state accords to its own investors (Dolzer and Christopher 2012, 
108). Furthermore, with respect to Transfer of Funds, these two authors note that all treaty schemes are negotiated 
against the backdrop of the host state’s “monetary sovereignty.” Accordingly, the host state has “the exclusive right 
to determine its own monetary unit, to give the unit legal meaning, to fix the exchange rate and to regulate, restrict or 
prohibit the conversion and transfer of foreign exchange” (Dolzer and Christopher 2012, 213). 
20 See Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 30 (Winter 2010). 
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interpretations attributed to Northern and Southern foreign investors with respect to these 
two provisions and possibly others might substantially explain the insignificance of 
South-South BITs. This finding is also corroborated by Demir (2016), who found that 
aggregate South-South FDI flows may have a harmful effect on the institutional 
development of host countries, whereas North-South FDI flows have no significant effect. 
1.5 Potential Mechanisms 
The empirical analysis suggests that investment treaties have improved the 
socioeconomic conditions of Southern countries. But how are socioeconomic conditions 
defined in the ICRG’s methodology? The guide’s authors refer to the socioeconomic 
pressure faced by governments that could prevent them from reaching their 
developmental goals. The authors identify three subcomponents of socioeconomic 
pressure, namely unemployment, poverty, and consumer confidence. To make sense of 
these findings, one needs to consider the potential effects that FDI generated by BITs 
might have on each of these subcomponents. In fact, consistent with some strands of 
economic theory, some economists believe that FDIs have positive and significant effects 
on employment, poverty reduction, and economic growth. 
 In the same vein, many developing and transitional economies view FDI as a 
means to attract capital, technology, marketing expertise, and management skills 
(Smarzynska 2004). Some authors believe that the effect of FDI on the labor market is 
most effective when FDI is directed to a labor-intensive sector. Studies such as that by 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) show that, as a result of FDI inflows, recipient countries have 
witnessed more competition in their domestic industries. In Africa and in countries such 
as Venezuela and the Czech Republic, the authors demonstrated that foreign-owned firms 
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do better than their domestic counterparts. On empirical grounds, evidence of the 
spillover effect of FDI is not as clear-cut as stated by previous literature on the subject. 
Smarzynska (2004) argues that the spillover might occur vertically rather than 
horizontally, through a process of “backward linkage” in which domestic firms and their 
multinational counterparts collaborate in producing goods and services. 
 Studies of the effects of FDI on poverty are rare. The very few papers that have 
addressed this issue are not conclusive or convincing in their findings. In fact, poverty 
reduction should be a logical result of the economic growth and increased job 
opportunities generated by FDI, if the wealth generated by FDI indeed reaches the poor. 
Aaron (1999) argues that there is no direct link between FDI and poverty reduction, 
although one can imagine an indirect relationship through economic growth. Tambuman 
(2005) provides a good summary of the three channels through which FDI could lead to 
poverty reduction: (1) labor-intensive economic growth; (2) transfers of new technology, 
knowledge, and other intangible assets; and (3) allocation of tax revenue paid by foreign 
firms. With respect to the first channel, Tambuman notes that FDI might reduce poverty 
if it were directed toward labor-intensive activities that generated jobs. Following the 
second channel, transfers of intangible assets could strengthen local skills, which in turn 
would result in job creation and increased productivity, with the ultimate goal being 
poverty reduction. The third channel projects that tax revenues collected by the host 
government from foreign firms might help generate the resources needed to pay for social 
assistance programs. 
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1.6 Robustness Analysis 
1.6.1 Robustness Check of the Null Effect of BITs 
In this section, I explore the sensitivity of the present findings to additional robustness 
checks. First, the empirical results are based on a measure of BITs generated on the basis 
of the date of entry into force of the agreements. An alternative approach would be to use 
a measure of BITs based on the date of signature of the agreements. Note that a BIT 
signed in a given year can take from no time at all to eighteen years before coming into 
effect. In fact, a BIT signed in a given year takes on average two and a half years before 
becoming effective. For that reason, there exists a net discrepancy between the number 
of BITs signed and the number of BITs that have actually entered into force. I tested 
whether the effects of BITs on IQ are sensitive to the nature of BITs (signed or entered 
into force), and the results show no significant effects of signed but not yet effective BITs 
on IQ. These findings indicate that BITs have an effect on IQ only when they enter into 
force. 
 To ensure that a handful of cases don’t drive the findings, I reestimated equation 
(4) for the Southern countries excluding outliers. During the period 1984–2012, China 
signed 139 BITs, which is the highest number among the Southern countries. Thus, I 
repeated the regression analysis excluding China and found similar results. The results 
still show a positive and significant effect of BITs on IQ in the Southern countries. 
Additionally, the findings still hold after dropping the bottom 1% of the distribution of 
BITs. 
 With respect to the lack of effect of BITs on other components of the IQ index 
such as corruption, law and order, government stability, quality of bureaucracy, and 
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investment profile, I tested the sensibility of these findings against alternative definitions 
of institutional quality. The data source closest to the ICRG data I used to obtain my 
primary results is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, which provide 
institutional quality data. As with the ICRG data, the World Bank reports on governance 
indicators along six dimensions.21 I defined an institutional quality index by taking the 
average of these indicators and estimated the effects of BITs on this newly constructed 
IQ index and on each of its components using the SGMM22. The (unreported) results 
show no significant effects of BITs on IQ and its components. Next, I extended this 
robustness check of the lack of BIT effects on IQ by using other data such as that of 
POLITY IV,23 the Freedom House,24 and A. Kuncic and still found no significant effects. 
 Finally, recent data on international investment agreements (IIAs) have shown a 
declining trend in BIT signings. This reduction in the number of BITs signed can be 
explained by the fact that some investment-related provisions are now included in other 
agreements such as free trade agreements and other economic partnership agreements. 
Therefore, as a final robustness check, I controlled for FTAs signed by Southern 
countries, and the results are not significantly different.25 
1.6.2 Robustness Check of the Positive Effects of BITs on Socioeconomic Conditions 
One of the main findings of this article is that bilateral investment treaties have improved 
socioeconomic conditions in Southern countries. I have measured socioeconomic 
                                                 
21 The Worldwide Governance Indicators provide information for 215 countries and territories starting from 1996, 
broken down into the following six dimensions: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of 
violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. 
22 SGMM refers to System of Generalized Method of Moments. 
23 POLITY IV provides annual information on the characteristics of political regimes, and transitions from one 
regime to another, during the period 1800–2013. 
24 The Freedom House provides reports on the degree of democratic freedoms in countries worldwide during the 
period 1800–2015. 
25 The results for controlling for free trade agreements are not reported in the present article. 
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conditions using ICRG indicators, which are based on opinion and thus are qualitative by 
nature. To the best of my knowledge, the other primary set of measures of socioeconomic 
conditions is that provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Of 
these UNDP indicators, the one most similar to the socioeconomic conditions defined by 
the ICRG is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).26 But the MPI data are so 
irregular that they are not suitable for a time series analysis. For that reason, in the 
robustness check, I used a cross-section analysis to confirm the findings. Another 
indicator, which is less similar to the socioeconomic conditions of the ICRG than the MPI 
data but which does provide an assessment of the human development outcome a country 
has achieved in a given year, is the Human Development Index (HDI).27 The HDI 
comprises three dimensions, namely life expectancy, knowledge captured by years of 
schooling, and standard of living. Both indicators, the HDI and the MPI, contrary to the 
ICRG indicators, are quantitative measures of socioeconomic conditions. 
 The cross-section analysis results using the MPI as a dependent variable are 
reported in table 8 below. The results are based on a sample of forty-three Southern 
countries for which MPI data are available. Most data are available for most countries in 
years 2006 and 2012. Consequently, these years have been retained in the cross-section 
analysis. Across all specifications in 2006 and 2012, as shown in columns 1–8 of table 8, 
the results show that BITs have reduced the MPI, meaning that cumulative bilateral 
                                                 
26 According to the Human Development Report 2016, MPI = H*A where 𝐻 =
𝑞
𝑛⁄ , q is the number of people 




𝑞⁄  is the intensity of poverty and 𝐶𝑖 is the 
deprivation score of the ith poor person. 
27 The Human Development Report defines HDI as the geometric mean of three dimension indexes, 
𝐻𝐷𝐼 = (𝐼_𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝐼_𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝐼_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
1





investment treaties have improved the socioeconomic conditions of households in 
Southern countries by reducing the multidimensional poverty indicator. Note also that the 
key explanatory variables such as per capita GDP and education all show the expected 
signs. Both education and per capita GDP have significant and negative effect on the 
dependent variable MPI. These results are consistent with our main finding that bilateral 
investment treaties have improved socioeconomic conditions in Southern countries. On 
the other hand, we are unable to confirm the same finding using South-North and South-
South analysis. 
 I conducted a similar exercise using the HDI as the dependent variable. The cross-
section results in years 2006 and 2012 reported in Table 8 below show that cumulative 
bilateral investment treaties have a positive and significant effect on human development 
indicators, meaning that BITs have improved the socioeconomic conditions of 
households in Southern countries. The positive signs uncovered here for the effects of 
BITs on HDIs, as opposed to the negative signs founds for the effects of BITs on MPIs, 
are the expected ones, given that HDIs capture the development outcome achieved by a 
country. Also, the key independent variables, education and per capita GDP, continue to 
exhibit the expected signs. Interestingly, the South-North and South-South analysis of the 
effect of BITs on the HDI reported in table 9 reveals that South-North investment treaties 
have a positive and significant effect on human development. These results confirm one 
of the main findings of this article, that South-North investment cooperation is more 
beneficial to Southern countries than other configurations of BITs in terms of improving 
socioeconomic conditions. 
49 
Table 1. 8 Effects of cumulative BITs on Multidimensional Poverty Index 
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Table 1. 9 Effects of cumulative BITs on Human Development Index, HDI 
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A substantial body of literature in international relations and in legal studies has focused 
on the possibility that states might change their behavior subsequent to making 
international commitments. Most of the topics investigated in this research are related to 
environmental issues, and the studies have not been able to reach consensual conclusions 
(Downs et al. 1996). Only a few of these research papers have investigated this question 
in relation to economic matters (Beth 2000). The present analysis, which is based on a 
panel data of 132 countries during the period 1984–2012, addresses econometric issues 
such as omitted variables and the endogeneity of the variable of interest—BITs—that 
may have biased findings in previous studies. 
 The results suggest that investment treaties have no significant effect on 
institutional quality over the full sample; however, the analysis conducted at the 
subsample level revealed that BITs have a positive and significant effect on the 
institutions of Southern countries. A closer look at the components of the institutional 
quality index revealed that the positive and significant results are essentially due to the 
effect that BITs have on the socioeconomic conditions of Southern countries. With 
respect to the other components of the IQ index (corruption, government stability, 
investment profile, law and order), no evidence of a significant effect of BITs is found. 
This dearth of significant effect is robust to using alternative definitions of institutions 
and consistent with previous findings. Finally, the results also show that South-North 
BITs have a positive and significant effect on institutions via their socioeconomic 
dimensions in Southern countries, while South-South BITs appear insignificant. This 
finding indicates that Southern countries might be better off signing investment 
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agreements with Northern countries than with countries similar to them in the South. The 
Bretton Woods institutions (the Word Bank and the IMF), which advocate good 
institutional quality, should encourage Southern countries to diversify the set of foreign 
firms operating in their territory by signing more South-North investment cooperation 
agreements. This will help build a much broader strategic framework through which they 
can enhance their institutional quality. One last point to mention is the heterogeneity of 
BITs. In this paper I made the implicit assumption of the homogeneity of BITs. An avenue 
for future research is to distinguish among BITs by constructing BITs indexes based on 



















Appendix 1.A: System GMM 
The dynamic System GMM estimation results include the lag institutional quality (IQ) 
and BITs variables in the GMM style option while the remaining explanatory variables 
are included in the IV style option. Given the short time period (T=7) of the dataset, the 
results are mostly based on lag(2,5) using the collapse option which prevents from 
instruments proliferation. 
Lag(m,n) with m>n indicates that lagged levels dated from t-n to t-m will be used as 
instruments for the transformed equation, and the first differenced dated t-n+1 will be 
used as instruments for the levels equation. 
Appendix 1.B Institutional Quality Data 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data is compiled and provided by the 
PRS group. They collect political, financial and economic data on a monthly basis from 
140 countries. These data are then converted into risk by assigning points to factors. 
The notation system is such that a country with lowest risk has the highest risk points 
and the one with the highest risk has the lowest risk points. The political dimension has 
12 components while each of the other two dimensions (financial and economic) has 5 
components. The following table presents a group summary of the 12 components of 
the political risk dimension. 
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Table 1. 12 Definition and Sources of the variables  
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Table 1. 14 Eigen values of the PCA 
Component  Eigenvalue Difference     Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1    5.658 4.291 0.472 0.472 
Comp2   1.367 0.197 0.114 0.586 
Comp3    1.171 0.360 0.098 0.683 
Comp4    0.811 0.195 0.068 0.751 
Comp5    0.616 0.089 0.051 0.802 
Comp6    0.526 0.042 0.044 0.846 
Comp7    0.485 0.081 0.040 0.886 
Comp8  0.403 0.103 0.034 0.920 
Comp9  0.300 0.048 0.025 0.945 
Comp10  0.253 0.038 0.021 0.966 
Comp11 0.215 0.021 0.018 0.984 
Comp12   0.194 . 0.016 1.000 
 
Table 1. 15 Eigen vectors of the PCA  
Variable  Comp1      Comp2    Comp3    Comp4  
 
Comp5 
   Comp6  Unexplained  
cor 0.288 -0.394 0.134 -0.228 -0.113 0.293 0.202 
lo 0.352 -0.008 -0.016 -0.298 -0.155 0.176 0.197 
ip 0.275 0.128 -0.519 0.281 0.292 -0.119 0.110 
gs 0.182 0.537 -0.435 0.002 0.018 0.456 0.087 
bq 0.337 -0.325 -0.130 -0.021 -0.068 0.056 0.190 





Table 1. 16 Annual data estimation results, Full sample, 1984-2012. 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑡) 
FE    Diff GMM    Syst GMM  
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑡−1) 0.8446*** 0.8452***  0.8599*** 0.8576***  0.8476*** 0.8473*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0101)  (0.0322) (0.0321)  (0.0273) (0.0272) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠(𝑡−1) -0.0006 -0.0006   -0.0010 -0.0014   -0.0011 -0.0009 
  (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0029) (0.0030)   (0.0011) (0.0010) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0058** 0.0056*  0.0034 0.0021  0.0137*** 0.0126*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0029)  (0.0088) (0.0094)  (0.0043) (0.0037) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0002 0.0002  -0.0007 -0.0015  0.0019 0.0016 
 (0.0006) (0.0006)  (0.0054) (0.0055)  (0.0016) (0.0016) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0202 -0.0224  0.0124 0.0158  0.0092 0.0101 
 (0.0647) (0.0642)  (0.0759) (0.0759)  (0.0097) (0.0093) 
legor_uk       0.0899 0.0900 
       (0.0717) (0.0740) 
legor_fr       0.0239 0.0264 
       (0.0494) (0.0576) 
legor_ge       0.0942** 0.0862* 
       (0.0393) (0.0519) 
legor_sc       -0.0654 -0.0290 
       (0.1252) (0.1200) 
Ethnic  0.1808***   -0.0274   -0.0226 
  (0.0333)   (0.0486)   (0.0831) 
dist_coast        -0.0014 
        (0.0287) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)  0.0011   -0.0013   -0.0015 
  (0.0011)   (0.0042)   (0.0010) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)  0.0003   0.0010   0.0004 
  (0.0004)   (0.0013)   (0.0002) 
Constant 0.6597** 0.5340*     0.5730*** 0.6039*** 
 (0.3208) (0.3179)     (0.1676) (0.1902) 
Observations 3,696 3,696  3,564 3,564  3,696 3,696 
R-squared 0.8178 0.8179       
# of country 132 132  132 132  132 132 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
AR(1) Test       0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
AR(2) Test     0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Sargan (P-value)   0.650 0.606  0.808 0.808 
Instruments       36 39   45 49 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes 
The dependent variable is the Institutional Quality Index constructed as the simple average of six of the political 
risk components providedby the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
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Table 1. 17 Estimation results, Full sample, 1984-2012, 5 Years data  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑡) FE Full Sample   
Diff GMM Full 
Sample   Syst. GMM Full Sample 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑡−1) 0.3678*** 0.3719***  0.2960** 0.3076**  0.3769*** 0.3632*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0385)  (0.1191) (0.1227)  (0.1004) (0.1079) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠(𝑡−1) -0.0015 -0.0013   0.0236 0.0251   -0.0013 -0.0005 
  (0.0019) (0.0020)   (0.0158) (0.0156)   (0.0027) (0.0027) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0141 0.0148*  0.0305 0.0285  0.0368*** 0.0354*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0087)  (0.0261) (0.0253)  (0.0099) (0.0093) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0026 0.0030  0.0272** 0.0299**  0.0173*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0024)  (0.0116) (0.0119)  (0.0043) (0.0050) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.3530 -0.3689  0.8378 0.8597  0.0200 0.0412 
 (0.3109) (0.3123)  (0.7530) (0.7475)  (0.0287) (0.0338) 
legor_uk       0.8211*** 0.2606 
       (0.1649) (0.2222) 
legor_fr       0.4577*** -0.0726 
       (0.1229) (0.2565) 
legor_ge       0.5681*** 0.0697 
       (0.1206) (0.2071) 
legor_so        -0.5985** 
        (0.2740) 
Ethnic        0.2111 
        (0.2821) 
dist_coast        -0.1293 
        (0.0931) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)  0.0080*   0.0131   -0.0063 
  (0.0046)   (0.0087)   (0.0042) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)  -0.0003   -0.0007   0.0017 
  (0.0017)   (0.0028)   (0.0012) 
legor_sc       0.3389  
       (0.2591)  
Constant 1.2807 1.0963     1.4283** 2.1034** 
 (1.5523) (1.5559)     (0.5843) (0.8240) 
Observations 660 660  528 528  660 660 
R-squared 0.4378 0.4405       
# of country 132 132  132 132  132 132 
Year FE YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
AR(1) Test       0.035 0.041   0.000 0.001 
AR(2) Test     0.062 0.097   0.035 0.031 
Sargan (P-value)   0.180 0.272  0.512 0.465 
Instruments       13 15   22 26 
Notes: The dependent variable is Institutional Qualityprovided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
The variable of interest,𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) is the cumulative number of BITs signed by a country up to year t-1.  
The legal origin variables are:  legor_uk which refers to English legal origin, legor_fr is theFrench legal origin, 
legor_so is the Socialist legal origin and legor_ge is the German legal origin. 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to Natural  
Resources and 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) is Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast refers to the coastal distance. 
The variableEthnic refers to Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1. 18 Hausman test results 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t) 
FE RE     FE-RE S.E. 
(1) (2)     (3) (4) 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t−1) 0.3290*** 0.6596***  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(t−1) -0.331 0.0243 
 (0.0375) (0.0281)     
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠(t−1) -0.0025 -0.0001  𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠(t−1) -0.002 0.0015 
 (0.0018) (0.0011)     
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0013 0.0195***  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) -0.018 0.0076 
 (0.0092) (0.0030)     
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0007 0.0041***  𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) -0.003 0.0025 
 (0.0021) (0.0010)     
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.1843 0.0088  𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.193 0.2435 
 (0.3057) (0.0160)     
Ethnic -0.1211 -0.1124  Ethnic -0.009 1.1316 
 (0.1356) (0.1151)     
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1) 0.0034 -0.0029  𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1) 0.006 0.0044 
 (0.0038) (0.0021)     
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1) 0.0005 0.0011**  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1) -0.001 0.0012 
 (0.0016) (0.0005)     
legor_uk  0.3828***  Year   
  (0.0636)  3 -0.001 . 
legor_fr  0.1919***  4 0.113 0.0314 
  (0.0505)  5 0.424 0.0711 
legor_ge  0.3094***  6 0.479 0.1063 
  (0.0700)  7 0.528 0.1402 
legor_sc  0.2989**     
  (0.1242)     
dist_coast  -0.0798     
  (0.0533)     
Constant 2.4308 1.0651***     
 (1.5857) (0.2014)     
Observations 792 792  chi2(13)= 197.38  
R-squared 0.3682   Prob>chi2 = 0.000  
# of countries 132 132     
Year FE YES YES     
Notes:The dependent variable is the Institutional Quality Index constructed as the simple average of six of the political 
risk components provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Columns 1 and 2 give Fixed Effects and Random  
Effects estimation results, respectively. Column 3 gives the difference of columns 1 and 2; in column 4, the standard errors 









Syst. GMM,  Southern Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑆𝐶(𝑡−1) 0.5899*** 0.5893*** 0.5814*** 0.5889*** 0.5847*** 0.5768*** 
 (0.1476) (0.1470) (0.1470) (0.1483) (0.1456) (0.1459) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) 0.0229*** 0.0227*** 0.0227*** 0.0230*** 0.0226*** 0.0228*** 
  (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0070) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0376** 0.0378** 0.0372** 0.0372** 0.0367** 0.0353** 
 (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0169) (0.0157) (0.0159) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) 0.0036* 0.0034 0.0037* 0.0036* 0.0031 0.0035 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0023) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0411 -0.0416 -0.0316 -0.0410 -0.0219 -0.0106 
 (0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0357) (0.0360) (0.0381) (0.0398) 
legor_uk 0.3123** 0.3030* 0.3672** 0.5582** 0.5520** 0.2794 
 (0.1471) (0.1620) (0.1562) (0.2406) (0.2398) (0.1711) 
legor_fr 0.1582* 0.1474 0.2170** 0.4001** 0.4389** 0.1679 
 (0.0814) (0.0971) (0.0889) (0.2038) (0.2119) (0.1156) 
legor_ge -0.2442 -0.2601 -0.0650   -0.1297 
 (0.1818) (0.1917) (0.2395)   (0.2623) 
legor_so    0.2499 0.3358*  
    (0.1835) (0.2030)  
Ethnic  -0.0526    0.0689 
  (0.2411)    (0.2506) 
dist_coast   -0.1752   -0.1904 
   (0.1385)   (0.1274) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)    0.0008  0.0013 
    (0.0043)  (0.0045) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1)     0.0018 0.0019 
     (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Constant 0.8021 0.8464 0.8792 0.5539 0.5479 0.9050 
 (0.5742) (0.5794) (0.5842) (0.6174) (0.6026) (0.5813) 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 
# of country 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




0.306 0.297 0.306 0.307 
Instruments 20 21 21 21 21 24 
Notes: The dependent variable is Socioeconomic Conditions provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
The variable of interest,𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑆(𝑡−1) is the cumulative number of BITs signed by a country at time (t-1). The legal origin 
variables are:  legor_uk which refers to English legal origin, legor_fr is the French legal origin, legor_so is the Socialist 
legal origin and legor_ge is the German legal origin. 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1)refers to Natural Resources and 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑡−1) is  
Openness to trade. The variable dist_coast refers to the coastal distance. The variableEthnic refers to Ethnolinguistic 
Fragmentation. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1. 20 Effect of BITS on other components , Southern Countries 
 Dep Var. Syst. GMM,  Southern Countries 
CO QB GS LO IP 
Lagged Dep Var. 0.3195** 0.7054*** 0.1118 0.7290*** 0.5588** 
 (0.1339) (0.0703) (0.2492) (0.1201) (0.2834) 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠(𝑡−1) 0.0064 0.0003 -0.0129** 0.0027 -0.0052 
  (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0044) (0.0055) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(t−1) 0.0209 0.0148** 0.0217 0.0194* 0.0217 
 (0.0132) (0.0060) (0.0146) (0.0108) (0.0167) 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑆𝑒𝑐(t−1) -0.0012 0.0046* 0.0053 0.0004 0.0055 
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0026) (0.0037) 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑜𝑝(t−1) -0.0028 0.0939** 0.0617 0.0044 -0.0096 
 (0.0491) (0.0383) (0.0609) (0.0366) (0.0317) 
legor_uk -0.0324 0.3847* -0.3874 -0.0119 1.4536** 
 (0.1799) (0.2037) (0.2455) (0.2847) (0.5774) 
legor_fr -0.2390 -0.0249 -0.4158* -0.1353 1.3103*** 
 (0.1811) (0.1198) (0.2155) (0.3319) (0.4369) 
legor_ge 0.0539 0.0051 0.2649 0.2657 1.0529** 
 (0.3849) (0.4069) (0.4464) (0.2823) (0.4654) 
Ethnic 0.2688 -0.0437 -0.3144 -0.0922 -0.0242 
 (0.3209) (0.2424) (0.2930) (0.2221) (0.2435) 
dist_coast -0.3205** -0.2228* 0.1315 0.0342 0.0188 
 (0.1626) (0.1313) (0.2862) (0.1024) (0.1235) 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑠(t−1) -0.0092* -0.0037 0.0112* 0.0027 -0.0005 
 (0.0052) (0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0039) 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(t−1) 0.0025 0.0036** 0.0020 0.0015 0.0021 
 (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Constant 2.2757*** 1.4122*** 4.2901*** 0.9849 -0.1684 
 (0.6689) (0.3384) (1.3800) (0.8308) (0.7779) 
Observations 564 564 564 564 564 
# of country 94 94 94 94 94 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(1) Test 0.003 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.330 
AR(2) Test  0.251 0.002 0.593 0.277 0.373 
Sargan (P-value) 0.977 0.951 0.319 0.857 0.956 
Instruments 26 26 26 26 26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1. 21List of countries in the sample with the total number of BITs, 1984-2012 
Albania (41) Dominican (12) Korea (91) Qatar (48) 
Algeria (48) Ecuador (27) Kuwait (62) Romania (83) 
Angola (09) Egypt (98) Latvia (46) Russia (73) 
Argentina (58) El Salvador (22) Lebanon (52) Saudi Arabia (22) 
Armenia (39) Estonia (28) Libya (38) Senegal (19) 
Australia (23) Ethiopia (30) Lithuania (53) Sierra Leone (02) 
Austria (67) Finland (80) Luxembourg (90) Singapore (34) 
Azerbaijan (47) France (84) Madagascar (06) Slovak (60) 
Bahamas (01) Gabon (12) Malawi (06) Slovenia (40) 
Bahrain (31) Gambia (14) Malaysia (62) South Africa (48) 
Bangladesh (27) Germany (102) Mali (15) Spain (89) 
Belarus (60) Ghana (26) Malta (21) Sri Lanka (18) 
Belgium (90) Greece (43) Mexico (30) Suriname (03) 
Bolivia (23) Guatemala (19) Moldova (40) Sweden (61) 
Botswana (10) Guinea (18) Mongolia (43) Switzerland (94) 
Brazil (14) Guinea-Bissau (02) Morocco (64) Syrian (41) 
Brunei Darussalam (08) Guyana (07) Mozambique (24) Tanzania (13) 
Bulgaria (71) Haiti (04) Namibia (14) Thailand (38) 
Burkina Faso (13) Honduras (12) Netherlands (91) Togo (02) 
Cameroon (09) Hong Kong  (15) New Zealand (04) Trinidad and Tobago (12) 
Canada (31) Hungary (60) Nicaragua (20) Tunisia (52) 
Chile (53) Iceland (09) Niger (03) Turkey (89) 
China (139) India (82) Nigeria (26) Uganda (13) 
Colombia (12) Indonesia (63) Norway (16) Ukraine (73) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (15) Iran (60) Oman (35) United Arab Emirates (40) 
Congo, Rep. (12) Iraq (06) Pakistan (46) United Kingdom (38) 
Costa Rica (19) Israel (37) Panama (18) United States (40) 
Cote d'Ivoire (05) Italy (97) Papua New Guinea (03) Uruguay (32) 
Croatia (59) Jamaica (16) Paraguay (21) Venezuela (30) 
Cuba (60) Japan (16) Peru (33) Vietnam (60) 
Cyprus (28) Jordan (51) Philippines (36) Yemen (38) 
Czech (91) Kazakhstan (45) Poland (63) Zambia (08) 
Denmark (57) Kenya (12) Portugal (59) Zimbabwe (31) 
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Top 10 BITs over 1984 - 2010 in the North
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Figure 1. 2 Series of annual Institutional Quality of a few countries, 1984-2012 
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Chapter 2: The Determinants of Investor-State Disputes: A New Empirical 
Appraisal 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the signing of the first bilateral investment treaty between Germany and Pakistan 
in 1959, the number of BITs signed worldwide has increased at a relatively slow pace to 
reach about 385 BITs by the end of 1989 (UNCTAD 2017).This period of slow growth 
was followed by a rapid proliferation of BITs between 1990 and 2000. Following the year 
2001, the number of BITs signed has been in steady decline. As of 2017, the total number 
of BITs signed is estimated at nearly 3,000. Most of these BITs were originally signed 
between developed and developing countries; developing countries aimed to attract and 
promote foreign investment, while developed countries sought to protect foreign 
investors from illegal expropriation or breaches of the clauses of an investment treaty on 
the part of the host country. Most BITs contain an investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) provision, which guarantees both parties, the investor and the host country, the 
right to international arbitration if a dispute arises. Recent years have witnessed an 
explosion in the number of dispute claims following the establishment of the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In 2015 alone, there were 70 cases 
of investor-state dispute claims, bringing the total number of investment dispute cases to 
696 (IIA Issue Notes 2016). The rapid growth of investor-state dispute claims seems to 
be a natural consequence of the proliferation of BITs since the early 1990s. 
The recent surge in investor-state dispute claims at the ICSID has captured the 
attention of several legal scholars, who have devoted numerous articles to the subject. If 
investment disputes have only caught the attention of scholars recently, trade disputes, on 
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the other hand, have long been investigated in the literature. In a recent publication, Miller 
Scott et al. (2015), in a descriptive analysis of investment dispute claims cases, concluded 
that large capital-exporting countries are the most likely to make use of the ICSID, while 
the respondent states are dominated by weak legal institutions. This paper seeks to 
investigate the determinants of investor-state disputes, examining the characteristics of 
the home country of investors and those of the investment host country. I argue that 
investment treaties are not the sole channels through which investor-state disputes 
originate; one must also account for other factors such as trade agreements. In fact, trade 
agreements are increasingly beginning to include some investment protection provisions 
in their texts. Failing to account for such an important factor suggests that the findings of 
previous studies on this subject should be taken with caution. Omitted variables in any 
empirical study cause some bias in the estimated coefficients. In the same vein, I also 
explore the possibility that investment host states that have several trading partners, either 
through trade agreements or other trade facilitations might experience a greater number 
of investment disputes. Specifically, I also investigate the effects of export partners on 
the incidence of investment disputes. I then explore the possibility that former colonial 
ties that permit and facilitate economic exchanges between former colonies and 
colonizers could also constitute a channel for investment disputes. If historical ties should 
not be ignored in any investigations of FDI decisions, then they should also be accounted 
for in any studies of investor-state disputes. Finally, I tackle the question of the effect of 
FDIs on the incidence of investment disputes by addressing the endogeneity of FDI using 
GMM estimations. 
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The empirical results show that both bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade 
agreements (FTAs) have a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of an 
investment dispute. The fact that BITs positively impact the incidence of investment 
disputes is not surprising, as most investment treaties include provisions specifying the 
use of the ICSID in case a dispute erupts. This is consistent with statistics showing that 
the vast majority of investor-state dispute claims evoke bilateral investment treaties 
previously signed. The positive effect of FTAs on the likelihood of disputes results from 
the fact that some trade agreements contain investment-related provisions, a practice that 
has gained momentum in recent years. The results show strong evidence that foreign 
investors are increasingly taking advantage of the establishment of the ICSID and its 
ratification by investment host countries. This is clearly reflected in the positive and 
significant effect of the ICSID dummy variable on the incidence of investment disputes. 
The other control variables, such as institutional capacity, are consistent with previous 
studies. The negative and significant effects of institutions on the incidence of investment 
disputes suggest that institutionally weak countries are vulnerable at different levels. In 
addition to having to give up their sovereign rights by bringing investment disputes to 
international arbitration, they must also face the high legal costs of investment arbitration 
with their already limited resources. Another key finding in this paper is the positive and 
significant effect of former colonial ties on investment disputes. This finding suggests 
that existence of a prior colonial relationship between the investment host state and the 
investor home state plays into the incidence of investment disputes. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents some background on 
investor-state disputes and the ICSID Convention. In sections 3 and 4, I explore the 
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determinants of investment disputes and present the methodological approach, 
respectively. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 addresses the 
robustness of the results. In section 7, I offer my conclusions. 
2.2 A Brief Background on Investor-State Disputes and the ICSID Convention 
There are conflicting findings on both theoretical and empirical grounds with regard to 
the effect of FDI on economic growth. The positive effect uncovered in theoretical models 
has not been unanimously supported empirically. Even on the empirical ground the results 
are not clear-cut, as the macro and micro empirical findings are divergent. Despite these 
opposing results, there is a belief in many countries, especially developing countries, that 
FDI is an important tool to achieve economic development, and consequently these 
countries strive to create a favorable environment for foreign investors. This investment 
climate is determined concomitantly by political, economic, and legal factors. On the 
other hand, factors such as the legal conditions in which foreign multinationals operate, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, and the transparency of the system of domestic regulations 
and dispute settlement will ultimately determine if the legal framework in place in a given 
country is suitable for foreign investment. 
In recent years, many developing countries have made efforts to improve their 
domestic legal system by enacting specific legislation in order to create a more favorable 
climate for foreign investors. Despite the guarantees embedded in such legislation, 
investors rightfully still fear the lack of independence of the domestic courts of many host 
states, given the evident lack of an independent executive or judiciary in many developing 
countries. In face of such skepticism on the part of potential investors, many host 
countries have taken additional steps to grant investors international legal guarantees by 
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signing BITs. One feature found in BITs is the dispute settlement provision,28 allowing 
foreign investors the option to present any disputes that have not been resolved amicably 
for settlement at an international jurisdiction. 
The origin of the ICSID can be traced back to the 1960s, when the World Bank took 
the initiative to put in place a mechanism to settle investment disputes between host states 
and foreign investors, apparently to fill in the “gaps” that were evident in the existing 
structures. The text of the ICSID Convention was drafted from 1961 to 1965 and then 
adopted by the executive directors of the Work Bank in March 1965. It entered into force 
in October 1996 with ratification by twenty states. Most of the early member states were 
developing countries, especially in Africa. Since the convention was adopted, the number 
of participating countries has grown steadily and reached 135 countries from around the 
world in 2002.29 As of April 2006, the number of contracting states of the ICSID 
Convention is estimated at 143 countries. 
The primary purpose of the ICSID Convention is to promote economic growth by 
creating a favorable investment environment that will, in turn, enable the development of 
private international investment. It also aims to equally protect foreign investors and host 
states by offering advantages to both parties. In fact, the possibility of seeking arbitration 
in an international jurisdiction is an enormous advantage to investors who suspect the 
impartiality of the domestic legal courts of host countries. At the same time, the 
ratification of the convention by the host state is a signal to potential foreign investors of 
                                                 
28 BITs include many other clauses addressing issues such as the scope and definition of foreign investment, most-
favored-nation (MFN) status, national treatment (NT), fair and equitable treatment, guarantees and compensation in 
respect of expropriation, warranties of free transfer of funds, capital, and profits, and more. 
29 After a period of hesitation in the 1980s, most Latin American countries ratified the ICSID Convention in the 
1990s. 
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its desire to offer a friendly investment environment. It also protects the host state against 
different forms of international litigation (Article 26). The ICSID Convention offers two 
methods of settling investment disputes: conciliation and arbitration. The conciliation 
method, which is more flexible and informal, is designed to help both parties reach an 
agreement, whereas arbitration is a more formal method. It is important to note here that, 
if the two parties are unable to reach an agreement, a binding award may be imposed. 
2.3 Review of the Literature on Investment Disputes and Their Determinants 
2.3.1 Theoretical Arguments 
Freeman (2013) has constructed a theoretical framework to explain the evolution of 
investment disputes between foreign investors and host states into arbitral disputes. 
Borrowing from Most and Starr (1989), the author uses the concepts of “opportunity” and 
“willingness” to develop his theory. These two concepts were originally developed to link 
the individual choices made at the micro level to the global environment that supports 
and structures the decisions made at the macro level. Freeman argues that the opportunity 
for host states to adhere to international arbitration to settle an investment dispute depends 
on the consent of the state. But the statistics show that most countries have signed and 
ratified the ICSID Convention. As of October 2017, the number of signatory and 
contracting states is 161, according to the ICSID database, and only a handful of states 
(eight) have solely signed the convention. These figures testify of the willingness of most 
states to resort to international arbitration in case of potential investment disputes. 
Furthermore, Freeman argues that the availability of substitutes to domestic courts and 
the financial cost of arbitration will ultimately determine whether or not a foreign investor 
will pursue arbitration at the international level. Also, given the initial investment already 
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sunk in the host state, it is not necessarily in the best interest of a foreign investor to seek 
international arbitration. The long-term nature of the returns generated by such 
investments makes it preferable for foreign investors to resort to other methods of dispute 
resolution to avoid unnecessary conflicts that might damage future investment 
cooperation. This argument is supported by Jensen (2008), who makes the case that 
investors in Vietnam are reluctant to resort to international arbitration, seeking rather to 
preserve good relations between themselves and local and national government officials. 
Also, even if an investor wins a dispute, this does not guarantee compliance on the part 
of the host state. But I argue that most countries would prefer to avoid noncompliance 
with an ICSID decision, because this would send a bad signal to potential investors in an 
environment of international competition for foreign capital. Therefore, it is in the best 
interest of both partners to find a common ground in the settlement of investment 
disputes. Finally, Freeman suggests that a theory of investor-state disputes needs to take 
into account the constraints borne by states that prevent them from engaging is such 
disputes.  
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2.3.2 Previous Empirical Studies 
Only a very few studies have examined the determinants of investment disputes. Most of 
the existing papers on disputes are trade related. The few studies that addressed the 
subject in relation with investment disputes are for the most part descriptive. One of the 
early studies on trade disputes relevant to the issues raised in this paper was by Horn et 
al. (1990). The authors examined whether the WTO dispute system is biased toward 
wealthy nations, which have the legal capacity and the economic power to afford the costs 
associated with trade disputes. They also argue that the high number of complaints 
brought by developed countries could be explained by the fact that these countries have 
the proper human capital needed to fully comprehend and detect breaches in trade 
agreements and to then take legal action. Additionally, they explore the possibility that 
more economically powerful countries might bring more disputes than poor countries 
because the latter find the costs to even initiate such complaints to be overwhelming. 
They argue that there should be a positive relationship between the probability of 
initiating a dispute and the difference in the GNP of the trading partners. The authors 
conclude that the low proportion of developing countries that initiate trade disputes is due 
to the discrepancy noticed in trade diversity and trade value. 
One important determinant of trade disputes is the legal capacity of a partner country, 
a topic that has been intensively covered in early papers investigating trade disputes. In 
the absence of an accurate measure of legal capacity, most studies have relied on a proxy 
variable such as income per capita or the number of delegates a country has in Geneva. 
Busch et al. (2009), using a survey of WTO members, devised a new measure of the legal 
capacity of member countries that demonstrated the inaccuracy of earlier proxies, as the 
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authors discovered a poor correlation between their new measure and the earlier proxies. 
Other studies (Breuss 2001; Bown 2003a; Chang 2002) have raised the possibility of 
economic retaliation following a dispute filed by a trading partner. This can be exercised 
either by suppressing economic assistance or bilateral aid, thus leading to the 
deterioration of economic relations between the two countries, or by showing reluctance 
to enter into any future trade agreement because of the impaired relations. This argument 
is relevant only in the context of trade disputes, which generally arise between two 
governments. But in the case of investment disputes, the preceding argument may not 
hold because the two parties involved are an investor and a host country. Nevertheless, 
the home country of the investor, if it becomes aware of such a dispute, might deter the 
investor from undertaking such action to preserve the good economic relations between 
the two countries. 
Besson and Mehdi (2004) among others (Iida 1999; Griffin 2002) affirm that 
international political factors could be a determinant element in trade disputes. 
Specifically, they argue that political relationships can exacerbate trade disputes, the 
outcome of which can be influenced by the advantage one partner may have over the 
other in terms of either resources or military superiority. I will not pursue the same line 
of reasoning in this paper but will instead argue that former colonial ties between the 
home state of the investor and the host state might influence a decision made by the 
investor to file a dispute against a host country. In fact, many studies have found 
supportive evidence that, in their investment decision-making process, firms generally 
account for factors such as culture, institutions, geographic proximity, and economic 
disparities (Ghemawat 2001; Shige and Tsang 2011). Historical links affect economic 
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exchanges between countries in many ways. Positive effects of historical ties on 
economic outcomes such as trade and foreign investment have been documented (Jones 
1996; Rangan 2000; Rose 2002). In some cases, the relationship can turn out to have a 
detrimental effect. Hostile or conflicted relations, and military conflicts, have been found 
to exert a negative effect on FDI and economic exchanges (Nigh 1985; Jensen and Young 
2008; Alfaro et al. 2008; Li and Vashchilko 2010). Given that historical ties affect foreign 
direct investment, one should thus account for that variable in analyzing the determinants 
of investment disputes. 
More recently, two papers (Kim 2016; Kuenzel 2017) have addressed other aspects 
of investment disputes. The latter examined the determinants of WTO trade disputes and 
concludes, among other findings, that there is a higher likelihood of treaty breach among 
larger WTO members. The former examined the issue of investor-state dispute settlement 
in relation to the rule of law and democracy, arguing that the reinforcement of democratic 
institutions in a host state is correlated to a low risk of pursing an investment dispute on 
the part of private investors. In fact, this argument has been corroborated by Freeman 
(2013), who uncovered a negative correlation between countries’ institutional capacity 
(in terms of rule of law, law and order, and corruption level) and the number of dispute 
claims brought against them after controlling for important variables such as number of 
ratified BITs, stock of FDI, GDP growth, FDI (as a percentage of GDP), exchange rate 
regime change, and other variables. 
In this paper, I contribute to the debate on the determinants of investment disputes by 
bringing to the analysis some geographic and cultural factors (contiguity, common 
official language, distance, former colonial ties) that inevitably affect economic 
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exchanges between countries and can potentially be a channel for investment disputes. 
Curiously, these important factors have been omitted from previous studies, rendering 
their findings biased. Additionally, I argue that bilateral investment treaties are not the 
only pass-throughs of investment disputes, as other kinds of treaties such as free trade 
agreements are increasingly incorporating some investment provisions in their texts. In 
the same vein, it can be argued that the more trade partners a country has, the more 
investment disputes the country will experience. Table 1 presents a summary of the 
control variables used in this paper. 
78 
Table 2. 1 Summary Statistics 
  Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dep.Var Disputes 292131 0.004 0.066 0 1 
Bilateral Control Var. BITs 292131 0.006 0.074 0 1 
 FTA 292131 0.009 0.095 0 1 
 InstDist 292131 8.847 6.517 0.004 66.068 
 ASYM 292131 0.621 0.299 5.17E-05 0.996 
       
Home Country Control Var. EduSec_Host 292131 68.059 30.682 3.886 160.619 
 logGDP_Host 292131 0.968 1.438 -2.087 4.122 
 GDPGr_Host 292025 0.000 0.170 -3.563 2.537 
 Trade_Host 292131 78.755 36.519 12.368 254.606 
 Polity_Host 292131 6.524 3.197 0 10 
 GS_Host 292131 6.731 1.642 0.903 10 
 FDIS_Host 292131 5916.129 21632.610 -28293.9 314007 
 ICSID_Host 292131 0.699 0.459 0 1 
       
Host Country Control Var. EduSec_Home 292131 81.151 31.979 4.607 160.619 
 logGDP_Home 292131 1.895 1.666 -1.715 4.456 
 GDPGr_Home 291998 0.000 2.348 -6.117 6.171 
 Trade_Home 292131 85.766 60.267 12.368 449.992 
 Polity_Home 292131 6.850 3.239 0 10 
 GS_Home 292131 6.804 1.571 0.902778 10 
 FDIS_Home 292131 6777.157 21075.440 -29679.4 314007 
 ICSID_Home 292131 0.733 0.442 0 1 
       
Geographical and Cultural Var. contig 292131 0.040 0.195 0 1 
 comlang_off 292131 0.127 0.334 0 1 
 colony 292131 0.019 0.138 0 1 
  ldist 292131 8.602 0.881 4.088 9.891 
Notes: BITs is a binary variable equals to 1 when host country h and home country of the  
Investors have signed a BIT in year t, FTA is also a binary variable defined similarly. The control 
variables include Secondary education (ratio of total enrollment to the population of the age 
group), GDP, Openness to trade (sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP), FDI stock, ICSID indicates 
if a country has ratified the ICSID convention (ICSID=1 if the country ratified the  
convention, 0 otherwise), Institutional variables: POLITY and Government Stability; Contiguity, 
 common official language,Colony and distance between the host country and home country  
of the investor. ASYM is the absolute value of the difference of the per capita GDP of the host 
country of the investment and that of the home country of the investors in percentage of the  
sum of the per capita GDP of both countries. 
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2.4 Methodological Approach 
2.4.1 General Setup 
Let’s consider two countries denoted by the indexes h and r involved in an investment 
dispute, where h is the home state of the investor and r the respondent state (host state). 
Note that the home state of the investor is only indirectly involved in an investment 
dispute, through its national doing business in a foreign country. 
Let’s define 𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 as a binary variable taking 1 if home and host countries have been 
involved in an investment dispute in year t and 0 otherwise. The goal is to determine the 
characteristics of home and host countries that influence the likelihood of an investment 
dispute between the two countries. The probability that two countries will become 
involved in an investment dispute can be modeled as follows: 
𝑃(𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝑋ℎ,𝑟𝛽 + 𝑋ℎ,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑋𝑟,𝑡𝛿 + 𝜑𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜃𝐹𝑇𝐴ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝛼𝑟 +
𝜗𝑡)             (1) 
where F is a cumulative density function (cdf) monotonically increasing in its argument. 
It can either be a Probit or a Logit function. Note that 𝑋ℎ,𝑟 represents the bilateral 
characteristics of home and host countries, while 𝑋ℎ,𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑟,𝑡 contain time variant 
individual characteristics of countries h and r. Also, 𝜇ℎ,𝛼𝑟 represents, respectively, home 
and host (respondent) countries’ fixed effects, and 𝜗𝑡is the time fixed effect. More 
specifically, equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
𝑃(𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹[𝛽0 + β1ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡ℎ,𝑟) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ,𝑟 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦ℎ,𝑟 +
𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦ℎ,𝑟 + 𝑋ℎ,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑋𝑟,𝑡𝛿 + 𝜃𝐹𝑇𝐴ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜑𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝛼𝑟 + 𝜗𝑡)                                     
(2) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡ℎ,𝑟 is the simple distance between the countries’ most populated cities, 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ,𝑟 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if both countries h and r have the 
same official language, 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦ℎ,𝑟  is a dummy taking 1 if countries h and r were ever in 
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a colonial relationship, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦ℎ,𝑟 is a dummy taking 1 if the two countries share 
a border. The individual time variant characteristics 𝑋ℎ,𝑡and 𝑋𝑟,𝑡 include the following 
variables: real GDP per capita, institutional quality; regional dummies (Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and America), 𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑠ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 as a binary variable indicating whether countries h and 
r have signed an investment treaty in year t, and 𝐹𝑇𝐴ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 as a binary variable taking 1 if 
both countries were part of a trade agreement in year t. 
2.4.2 Latent Variable Formulation 
Let 𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
∗   be a continuous variable (unobservable), namely a latent variable, that is 
determined as follows: 
𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡




′ 𝜓 + ℎ,𝑟,𝑡  (3’), where 𝜓 = (𝛽0  𝛽  𝛾  𝛿 𝜑 𝜃)
′ and ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 is the error term 
assumed uncorrelated to Z (exogeneity assumption). Although we do not observe 𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
∗ , 
we do observe the decision 𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 made by the investor (of home county h) to file a dispute 
claim against a country r (host or respondent country). We assume that a foreign investor 
will decide to file a claim against a country after carefully assessing the cost and benefit 
of such decision. The investor will probably do so if the net utility of the decision is 
positive. The ordinal characteristic of the utility function makes it difficult to observe the 
actual value of the net utility, but we do observe the final outcome of the decision made 
by the investor. This gives us the following decision rule: 
𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡  = 1  𝑖𝑓 𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
∗ = 𝑍ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
′ 𝜓 + ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 > 0 ;      (4) 
𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡  = 0  𝑖𝑓 𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
∗ = 𝑍ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
′ 𝜓 + ℎ,𝑟,𝑡  ≤ 0 .     (5) 
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The probability model that a dispute will occur between an investor of home country h 
and a respondent state r is conditional on the characteristic Z of both countries and, 
assuming that the error term follows a certain symmetric distribution, is given by: 
P(𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 = 1|𝑍) = P(𝐷ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
∗ > 0) = P ( ℎ,𝑟,𝑡 > −𝑍ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
′ 𝜓) = 1 − 𝐹(−𝑍ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
′ 𝜓) =
𝐹(𝑍ℎ,𝑟,𝑡
′ 𝜓)          (6) 
Depending on the distribution of the error term   it follows that the cdf F will either be 
a cumulative Logit function or a cumulative Probit function. Due to the simplicity it 
offers, most empirical studies tend to use the Logit model. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
The period under investigation in this article runs from 1987 to 2015, a time frame 
essentially driven by the fact that the first investment dispute to be filed with the ICSID 
occurred in 1987. The country sample I used is based on data availability, which led to 
106 host (respondent) states and 172 home states. Data on home and respondent states’ 
individual characteristics are from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2016). Other 
bilateral characteristics between countries such as distance, contiguity, common official 
language, and any colonial connection are from the CEPII.30 The FTA data is gathered 
from the World Trade Organization’s statistics (WTO 2016). Data on BITs and 
investment disputes are both from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Commerce (UNCTAD 2016). At UNCTAD’s website, data on disputes is available based 
on bilateral investment treaties and also on other kinds of treaties that have investment 
provisions. The data on institutional quality such as corruption, government stability, law 
                                                 
30 The CEPII is a French research center producing databases on the world economy. 
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and order, and quality of bureaucracy are from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) (PRS, 2016). 
According to the data gathered from UNCTAD (2017), the first investment dispute 
under a BIT was filed in 1987; the host state was Sri Lanka and the investor was from the 
United Kingdom. The number of cases brought before the ICSID gradually increased, 
with six cases filed in 1996; as of early 2017, the highest number of disputes filed in any 
give year was seventy-seven cases in 2015. 
Figure 2. 1Distribution of Investor-State disputes and BITs between 1987 and 2016 
 
Notes: The dark gray bars show the total number of BTs signed in a year while the light gray bars show 
the total number of disputes filed in a year. 
Source: Compiled from Unctad (2017). 
An investment dispute generally involves two parties, namely the host country and 
the foreign investor. Table 2 shows the top twenty host countries against whom an 
investment dispute has been filed and the top twenty home countries of investors who 
have filed a dispute. As of January 2017, according to data compiled by UNCTAD 
(2017), the most home states of investors have been developed countries while most states 
hosting the investments have been developing countries. This is not surprising, since most 







































































































































developing countries are capital-importing countries, while developed countries are 
generally the exporters. Except for a few developed countries in the list of host countries 
in table 2, there seems to be a correlation between the frequency of investment disputes 
brought against a country and that country’s institutional quality. In other words, 
countries with poor institutional quality tend to be involved in more investment disputes. 
Table 2. 2 Top 20 host and home countries involved in investment disputes 
Host States # of cases   Home States # of cases 
Argentina 59  USA 142 
Venezuela 40  Netherlands 74 
Spain 34  UK 57 
Czech Republic 33  Germany 47 
Egypt 29  France 37 
Canada 26  Canada 36 
Mexico 24  Spain 35 
Russia 23  Italy 29 
Ecuador 22  Belgium 27 
Poland 21  Switzerland 21 
India 20  Turkey 20 
Ukraine 19  Cyprus 16 
Kazakhstan 17  Austria 14 
USA 15  Greece 13 
Bolivia 14  Russia 13 
Hungary 14  Ukraine 9 
Romania 13  Sweden 7 
Peru 12  Chile 6 
Kyrgyzstan 11  Luxembourg 6 
Turkey 11   Mauritius 6 
Notes: The table shows the number of investment disputes brought 
against the host states and the number of cases per home states of  
the investor over the period 1987-2016. 
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD (2017) 
 
As stated in the methodological section, I explore the determinants of investment 
disputes base on Logit estimations. On the estimation standpoint, Probit and Logit models 
should yield similar results; they only differ at the tail end of the distributions. Table 3 
shows the estimation results for the Logit model. 
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2.5.2 Main Results 
Table 3 provides the Logit estimation results where the dependent variable is the 
investment dispute incidences between the foreign investor and the host country of the 
investment, after controlling for different sets of explanatory variables. Column (1) of 
table 3 gives the fixed effect estimation results of the benchmark equation controlling for 
education and government stability in a dyadic approach. Additional control variables in 
column (1) include BITs and also the asymmetry in economic power defined as the 
absolute difference in the log of GNP between the host country of the investment and the 
home country of the investor relative to the sum of the GNP of the two countries. Using 
the same control variables, column (2) augments the estimation results in column (1) by 
controlling for free trade agreements. The results in columns (1) and (2) show significant 
and positive effects of BITs and FTA on the incidence of investment disputes. 
One of the key control variables is government stability in the host country and in that 
of the home country of the investor. The results show a negative and highly consistently 
significant effect of the government stability of the host country on the likelihood of an 
investment dispute. The worse the institutional quality of the host country, the more likely 
it is that an investment dispute will erupt between a foreign investor and that country. A 
one-point decrease in the government stability of the host country increases the incidence 
of a dispute in a probability range between 6.3% and 17%. Also, the level of education in 
both countries seems to play a key role in how readily investment disputes are initiated. 
The estimation results reveal a positive and significant effect of education on the 
incidence of investment disputes. Disputes generally involve high costs, among which is 
legal cost. It is reasonable to think that only wealthy countries will have the required 
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resources to adequately face the incurred costs. Previous studies have used GDP as a 
proxy for legal costs, which has proven to be a poor proxy for legal human capital. 
Education is another variable that could be used as a proxy, but unfortunately this has not 
been tested in previous studies. Instead of resorting to external expertise to represent its 
interests at the ICSID, a host country could use its domestic legal resources. In the same 
vein, a log of GPD in the two involved countries has a positive and significant effect on 
the likelihood of an investment dispute, supporting the argument that wealthier countries 
are more capable of enduring the costs associated with an investment dispute. 
Additionally, the GDP growth of the home country of the investor has a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood of an investment dispute. This positive and significant 
effect of GDP is consistent across all specifications. But, for the host country, GDP 
growth is not consistently significant across all specifications except for the last 
specification in column (11). 
Another key variable generally used in analyzing investment disputes is the size of 
the investment host country relative to that of the home country of the investor. A foreign 
investor may behave differently depending on the size of the host country. Poor countries 
may have difficulty bringing charges against a powerful multinational enterprise (MNE) 
at the ICSID, or, similarly countries that are relatively weak may have disadvantages in 
facing MNEs. These observations justify the inclusion in the model specifications of the 
asymmetry variable, defined as the absolute difference in GDP between home and host 
countries relatively to the sum of GDPs of both countries. To avoid multicollinearity, I 
excluded the log GDP of host and home countries when the asymmetry variable enters 
the regressions. Consistently across all specifications (columns 1, 2, and 6–10), the results 
86 
in table 3 reveal a negative and significant effect of the asymmetry variable on disputes. 
One would expect that the wider the economic gap, the more likely it would be that an 
investment dispute will erupt. This finding is counterintuitive, puzzling, and hard to 
explain. A tentative explanation would be that both foreign investors and host countries 
get equitable treatment at the ICSID incentive dispute files as long as the legal cost does 
not exceed the dispute loss being claimed. 
Regarding other control variables, the results show that for host countries, ICSID 
membership is a determinant and a significant factor in the incidence of investment 
disputes. In fact, according to ICSID rules, a private investor can bring charge against a 
host country and expect a fair arbitral process only as long as the host country has 
consented to ICSID arbitration regardless of its decision to participate or not in the 
proceedings. The positive and significant effects of ICSID membership for the host 
country suggest that the ratification of the ICSID Convention is something that foreign 
investors are taking advantage of. The results also reveal that the aid variable is not a 
determinant factor of investment disputes, contrary to the trade dispute where bilateral 
assistance can deter receiving countries to engage in a trade dispute. Ceteris paribus, 
African, Asian, European, and Oceanian foreign investors are less likely to be involved 
in an investment dispute than their counterparts on the North American continent. The 
home country of the greatest number of claimants is the United States, with a total of 138 
claims as of the end of 2015, which represents about 20% of all claims (IIA Issue Note 2 
2016). Proximity seems to play a key role in the occurrence of investment disputes, the 
results showing that when the host country and the foreign investor’s home country share 
a common border, the likelihood of an investment dispute decreases significantly. This 
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finding seems at odds with the previous result, that the existence of a trade agreement 
significantly increases the likelihood of an investment dispute. In fact, one might argue 
that neighboring countries are more likely enter into trade agreements than countries that 
are distant from each other, such agreements forming the basis for potential investment 
dispute cases. Not surprisingly, I note that the distance variable has a significant and 
negative effect on the likelihood of an investment dispute. In fact, distance is generally 
viewed as a cost to foreign investment. 
One of the key findings shown in table 3 is the positive and significant effect of a 
common colonial history on investment disputes. This variable seems to play an 
important role in investment dispute. This could result from the fact that private investors 
in developed countries feel greater familiarity, comfort, and accessibility doing business 
in their host countries’ former colonies. Some of these investments might result in a 
dispute. Many scholars (Jones G. 1996; Rangan 2000; Makino et al. 2011) argue that, 
because of their historical ties, former colonies and their colonizers share similarities in 
terms of legal and administrative structure. This tends to reduce costs and facilitate 








Next, I explore how institutional distance affects the likelihood of an investment dispute. 
The preliminary results reported in table 4 show that the stability of the host country’s 
government affects the likelihood of an investment dispute. The more stable the host 
country, the less likely that an investment dispute will erupt. But, generally speaking, 
institutional factors are multidimensional and should not be restricted to government 
stability only. In this section, I will account for other components of institutions and then 
investigate how the institutional distance between the host county and the home country 
of the investor affects investment dispute. Following Kogut and Singh (1988) and others, 
I define the institutional development distance as follows: 









where i represents the ith dimension of the institution and Vi represents the variance of 
the ith dimension. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,ℎ,𝑡and𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑟,𝑡 are the institutional quality index of the ith 
component for countries h and r, at time t. 
 Across all specifications, the results shown in table 4 show a negative and 
significant effect of institutional distance on the likelihood of an investment disputes. At 
first glance, these results seem counterintuitive. One might suppose that the larger the 
institutional gap between the investment host country and the home country of the 
investor, the less likely it is that an investment dispute will erupt. In fact, the great 
majority of foreign investors and MNEs are from developed countries, while investment 
host countries are for the most part developing countries. The inverse relationship 
between the institutional gap variable and the incidence of disputes could be because 
MNEs operating in less-developed counties with weak institutions, after carefully 
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weighing the cost of pursing a dispute, might rather preserve the good relationship they 
entertain with the host country’s government with the hope that the returns on investments 
would be beneficial in the long term. In fact, most foreign investors aim for long-term 
returns when making investment decisions in developing countries. 
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Table 2. 4 Logit Estimations Results with Institutional Distance 
Dependent Variable: Investment Dispute (1: Yes; 0, No) 
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Also, I investigated whether the results are sensitive to alternative institutional 
measures (see table 6 in the appendix). Specifically, I noted an inverse relationship 
between the government stability of the host country and the incidence of disputes, 
whereas a direct relationship is found for the home country. Since the institutional quality 
variable used is subjective, I reestimated the twelve equations reported in table 4 using 
an alternative measure of institutions, which is provided by POLITY IV.31 Except for 
columns 7–11, the results reported in table 4 show a negative and significant effect of the 
POLITY IV variable on the probability of having an investment dispute. In other words, 
countries that tend toward autocratic systems of government are more likely to be part of 
an investment dispute than countries with more democratic forms of government. But, 
for investors’ home countries, I note an insignificant effect of POLITY on the incident of 
investment disputes, contrary to the results obtained for the government stability variable 
provided by the ICRG. 
2.6 Robustness Analysis: Alternative Specification 
2.6.1 Poisson Model - Negative Binomial Model – Zero Inflation 
The dependent variable is the number of investment disputes brought against the host 
state h in a giver year t. We therefore have a count-dependent variable that can take on 
values such as 0, 1, 2, …. Let 𝑌ℎ𝑡  be the dependent variable—the number of investment 
disputes. Poisson regressions offer a standard framework to model count data such as this 
one. But one important shortcoming of the Poisson distribution is its property of 
equidispersion (equal mean and variance). In fact, much of the data is overdispersed 
                                                 
31 POLITY IV provides information on authority and regime characteristics by coding democratic and 
autocratic “patterns of authority” and regime changes in independent countries. 
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(variance exceeds the mean), thus limiting the appropriateness of Poisson regressions to 
model such data. Many alternative models, such as Quasi Poisson or Negative Binomial 
distributions, have been suggested to handle the overdispersion issue. 
The Poisson model assumes that 𝑌ℎ1, … , 𝑌ℎ𝑇 are independent over time, conditional 
on 𝑋ℎ1, … , 𝑋ℎ𝑇. The conditional distribution of 𝑌ℎ𝑡 (the number of disputes) for host 
country h in year t given the regressors 𝑋ℎ𝑡 (strictly exogenous), following a Poisson 




, 𝑦 = 0,1,2, …(8) 
The parameter 𝜇ℎ𝑡 is generally formulated using a loglinear function, ln (𝜇ℎ𝑡) =
𝑋ℎ𝑡
′ 𝛽. The Poisson model is characterized by the following property: 𝐸[𝑌ℎ𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑡] =
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌ℎ𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑡] = 𝜇ℎ𝑡  (9) 
An alternative to the Poisson model that accounts for the overdispersion that most 
datasets present is the Negative Binomial model, which is simply a generalization of the 
Poisson model that allows the variance to exceed the mean by adding an individual, 
unobserved effect into the conditional mean as ln (𝜇ℎ𝑡) = 𝑋ℎ𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜆ℎ, where 𝛽 is a vector 
of unknown parameters. The general conditional distribution of the Negative Binomial 
model [see Green 2011] is given by: 























, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑄 = 2 − 𝑃  (10) 
The conditional mean is by 𝐸[𝑌ℎ𝑡|𝑋ℎ𝑡] = exp (𝑋ℎ𝑡
′ 𝛽)=𝜇ℎ𝑡 and the conditional 




𝑃−1), where P is a scaling parameter. For P=0, we 
have a Poisson model; for P=1, we have the Negative Binomial form 1 (NB1); and for 
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P=2, we have the Negative Binomial form 2 (NB2). All these models can be estimated 
using maximum likelihood estimation methodology. 
The type of dataset found in the present analysis calls for the use of zero inflated 
models. In fact, in many instances, a country will have several disputes brought against 
them in single year, and no disputes in any of the other years during the period under 
examination, 1987–2015. This causes the distribution of the number of disputes to exhibit 
a spike at zero. A large number of zeros indicates a country with “good institutions” that 
is only rarely involved in investment disputes, whereas other countries with “bad 
institutions” are often subject to these types of disputes. The dichotomy, zero and non-
zero groups, brought into the characteristics of the dataset at hand here coupled with the 
preponderance of zeros recommends to model the data with zero inflated models such as 
Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) or Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB). Zero inflated 
models provide an interesting approach of modeling the excess zero in addition to 
accounting for the overdispersion. The dataset is modeled on the Bernoulli distribution, 
using two data-generating processes. For any given observation, namely the number of 
disputes filed against host h in time t, process 1 for zero disputes count is chosen with 
probability 𝑝ℎ, and process 2 with probability 1 − 𝑝ℎ. Process 2, 𝑔(𝑦ℎ|𝑋ℎ), generates 
dispute counts from either a Poisson or a Negative Binomial distribution, so that: 
𝑦ℎ~ {
                      0      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦      𝑝ℎ
𝑔(𝑦ℎ|𝑋ℎ)     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦     1 − 𝑝ℎ
     (11) 
The probability of {𝑌ℎ = 𝑦ℎ|𝑋ℎ} is therefore as follows: 
𝑃(𝑌ℎ = 𝑦ℎ|𝑋ℎ, 𝑍ℎ) = {
𝑝ℎ(𝑍ℎ
′ 𝛾) + {1 − 𝑝ℎ(𝑍ℎ
′ 𝛾)}𝑔(0|𝑋ℎ)    𝑖𝑓  𝑦ℎ = 0
{1 − 𝑝ℎ(𝑍ℎ
′ 𝛾)}𝑔(𝑦ℎ|𝑋ℎ)  𝑖𝑓  𝑦ℎ > 0
  (12) 
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𝑍ℎrepresents the vector of zero-inflated covariates, and 𝛾 is the vector of zero-inflated 
parameters to be estimated. 
2.6.2 Results 
I begin my analysis of the results by looking at the basic count regression, namely the 
Poisson model, the results of which are shown in the first column of Table 5. The results 
clearly show a positive and significant effect of investment treaties and trade agreements 
on the likelihood of investment disputes. These results, consistent with those found in the 
first part of this paper, confirm my main findings. One significant result is that better 
institutional quality is associated with a lower probability of investment disputes. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the institution variable (Inst_Qual) is indicative of 
the low incidence rate of investment disputes as institutions improve. For instance, the 
incident rate ratio (IRR) for one standard deviation increase in the institutional quality is 
0.662; that is, one standard deviation increase in institutional quality reduces the expected 
count of disputes by 33%.32 And for a two standard deviation increase in institutional 
quality, the incident ratio is 0.438, which is equivalent to an expected 56% reduction in 
investment disputes. I also explore the possibility that countries with a greater number of 
export partners might experience more disputes, but the results as shown in the Poisson 
model reveal a positive but insignificant result. 
The particularity of the data used in the present study justifies the use of zero-inflated 
models. To be certain, I first tested for the appropriateness of zero-inflated models using 
a Vuong test, which is simply a comparison between the standard Poisson or Negative 
                                                 
32 Ceteris paribus, in the Poisson model the incident rate ratio (IRR) for a one-unit change in variable 𝑋𝑗 
is exp (𝛽𝑗). Therefore, for a one standard deviation increase in variable we get 𝐼𝑅𝑅 = exp (𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝜎𝑗), and 
the percentage change is given by [exp(𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝜎𝑗) − 1] ∗ 100. 
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Binomial Model and the Zero-Inflated Model. The Vuong results reported at the bottom 
of table 7 in the appendix show that the Z-values associated with both models are 
significant. Additionally, for the zero-inflated negative model, the dispersion parameter 
(LnAlpha) is significantly different from zero. These results show that zero-inflated 
models are a better fit for the dataset than standard count models. I then proceeded to 
estimate the zero inflated models. 
The results of the Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model are reported in the second 
column of table 5. It should be noted here that the results are shown in two parts. This is 
due to the fact that the ZIP model has two regimes. In one regime, the outcome is zero, 
and in the second regime, the outcome is modeled as a Poisson model. The inflated part 
of the results as displayed in column 2 specifies the equation that determines whether the 
disputes count is zero. For the predictor of the excess zeros, I chose the stability of the 
government in the host states. I argue that countries with stable governments and stronger 
enforcement of property rights should experience fewer investment disputes than those 
with unstable governments. The results show that the coefficient of government stability 
is positive and highly significant, thus revealing that the variable is a good predictor of 
the excess zeros. The inflated coefficient for this predictor indicates that one unit 
improvement in government stability in the host state reduces the log odds of an inflated 
zero by 0.187. 
The second regime of the ZIP model assumes that the data-generating process follows 
a Poisson distribution. This second part of the model presents the following outcomes. 
Not surprisingly, the key variables of interest, trade agreements, and investment treaties 
continue to bear the expected signs and have a positive and highly significant effect on 
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incidence of disputes. The control variable, GDP growth, has a positive and significant 
effect on the likelihood of investment disputes. This result should be expected, because 
investment disputes are costly and only wealthy countries can afford to bring dispute 
cases before an international court. Developing countries with low income should 
especially seek bilateral settlements to avoid the unnecessary depletion of their scarce 
resources. The cost of arbitration, which varies significantly from US$1 million to more 
than $2 billion, is estimated to account for more than 10% of an award (Franck 2011; 
Kim 2017). Additionally, according to the statistics available at Unctad (2017), about 
37% of investment disputes are decided in favor of states, while only of 27% of the cases 
are decided in favor of investors (Unctad, 2017). One important control variable included 
in the specifications is the number of export partners a given country has. The results 
show a positive and significant effect of export partners on disputes. Many trade 
agreements are now including some investment provisions; therefore, having more trade 
partners could induce more business activities or economic exchanges that could 
eventually constitute channels for investment disputes. It can also be seen from the results 
that European and Asian host countries are less likely to have disputes brought against 
them. This might have something to do with their somewhat better institutional quality. 
Another robustness check of the findings of this paper that addresses both the excess 
of zeros and the overdispersion of the data is the zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
model. The results reported in column 5 of table 5 are consistent with the previous 
findings. Most of the control variables continue to bear the expected signs. The stock of 
foreign direct investment has a positive and significant effect on the incidence of 
investment disputes. This result is not surprising, as one of the purposes of bilateral 
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investment treaties from the perspective of developing countries is to attract foreign 
investment. The inflow of investments generated by these treaties could also eventually 
lead to disputes between the host state and the foreign investor. The ICSID variable, 
which indicates whether a country has ratified the ICSID Convention, is negative and 
highly significant in both ZIP and ZINB estimations (see columns 2 and 5). One plausible 
explanation could be that countries that have ratified the convention fear the possibility 
that foreign investors have to resort to the ICSID for international arbitration, which thus 
deters them from engaging in actions detrimental to the investor’s interest. Both models 
(ZIP and ZINB) present some similarities in terms of the effects of institutional quality 
on the incidence of disputes. For instance, one standard deviation decrease in the quality 
of institutions of the host state yields an incidence rate ratio of 2 (a 100% increase in the 
IRR). 
And last, I explored the possibility that the endogeneity of the FDIs could potentially 
render the estimates biased and inconsistent. Such endogeneity could arise for many 
reasons, including omitted variables or strategic behaviors on the part of host states. Many 
countries sign BITs to attract foreign investment, which could potentially impact the 
incidence of disputes, as shown by the positive and significant effect of FDI stock on 
investment disputes (see table 5 below). But most countries care about their reputation 
and suffer substantial cost in terms of loss of FDI following disputes, as foreign investors 
are well aware of the dispute cases in which a host country is involved. It has been 
estimated that FDI loss can reach US$55 million on average, and FDI loss is more severe 
when the settlement favors the investor (Allee and Peinhardt 2011). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to think of reverse causality between FDIs and investment disputes. The GMM 
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results are similar to the previous findings. Natural resources, defined as a country’s 
resource endowment in oil, natural gas, coal, and other commodities, has no insignificant 
on the investment disputes. In addition, I note that the level of a country’s development, 
as measured by its per capita GDP, has a positive and significant effect on investment 
disputes. The other control variables, such as investment treaties and trade agreements, 










Table 2. 5 Zero Inflated Models estimations 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Poisson Est. ZIP Est. Poisson GMM Est. NB Est. ZINB Est. 
CBITs 0.049*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.034*** 0.012*** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
CPTAS 0.064*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) 
LNpcGDP -0.773 0.110 0.173** -0.237 0.095 
 (0.862) (0.082) (0.083) (0.200) (0.078) 
Nat_Resources 0.027* 0.003 0.006 0.033** 0.005 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) 
Trade Openness  -0.004 -0.006*** -0.005** 0.009** -0.004** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
GDP_growth 0.023 0.039** 0.015* 0.010 0.027* 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
LnFDI_Stock 0.202** 0.247*** 0.214*** 0.153*** 0.213*** 
 (0.087) (0.043) (0.040) (0.052) (0.035) 
Inst_Qual -0.303** -0.490*** -0.487*** -0.167* -0.487*** 
 (0.139) (0.078) (0.072) (0.094) (0.070) 
Exp_Partners 0.609 1.547*** 1.587*** 0.610 1.488*** 
 (1.404) (0.429) (0.356) (0.678) (0.351) 
ICSID 0.712** -0.192 -0.436*** 0.598** -0.434*** 
 (0.299) (0.154) (0.144) (0.239) (0.135) 
cont_africa  -0.077 -0.428** 2.450** -0.156 
  (0.162) (0.169) (1.193) (0.154) 
cont_asia  -0.973*** -1.250*** -0.577 -1.149*** 
  (0.198) (0.205) (0.575) (0.179) 
cont_europe  -0.645*** -0.942*** -0.910** -0.824*** 
  (0.216) (0.254) (0.423) (0.166) 
cont_oceania  -0.539 -0.586 2.311 -0.398 
  (0.337) (0.375) (4.370) (0.341) 
Constant  0.110 -1.015* -0.166 -0.478 
  (0.612) (0.563) (1.748) (0.564) 
Inflate   -0.187***     -3.726*** 
  (.0627)   (1.338) 
Constant  1.497***   14.388** 
    (0.387)     (5.626) 
Observations 2,494 2,494 2,408 2,494 2,494 
# of Countries 86   86  
FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the claim of investment disputes. CBITs is the cumulative number of BITs 
signed in a given year and CPTAs is the cumulative number of trade agreements signed in a given year. The 
variable Exp_Partners represent the number of export partners that a country has in a given year. ICSID is 
an indicator variable telling if the country has signed the ICSID convention. Inst_Qual is the quality of 
institutions measured by averaging Government Stability, Corruption, Quality of Bureaucracy, Law and 
Order, Investment Profile and Socioeconomic conditions. Trade openness is the sum of import and export 
in percentage of GDP.LnpcGDP is the natural log of per capita GDP. Natural resources represent the sum of 
oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents and forest rents. 





This paper seeks out the determinant factors of investor-state disputes from the dual 
perspective of the home state of the investor and the investment host state. Existing 
literature (e.g., Nathan W. 2013, Scott et al. 2015) has shown that the host country’s 
institutional capacity plays an important role in the incidence of investment disputes. My 
findings confirm that institutionally weak host countries have the largest number of 
dispute claims brought against them. Additionally, the results show that despite the 
institutional and economic advantages provided by a foreign investor’s home country, 
that investor might be reluctant to pursue an investment dispute due to sunk costs and the 
long-term nature of the return on investment. Also, I document that international 
investment treaties are not the sole pass-throughs of investment disputes. Other channels 
such as free trade agreements are relevant in any analysis of investment disputes because 
of the investment protection provisions they incorporate. Finally, former colonial ties that 
encourage extensive economic exchange between former colonies and colonizers are an 
important determinant of disputes. One major implication of this paper is that institutional 
quality still matters, especially in the investment host states, most of which are developing 
countries. 
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Chapter 3: Do Double Tax Treaties Crowd Out Tax Revenues?  
3.1 Introduction 
Many countries worldwide are increasingly confronted with enormous fiscal deficits due 
to a rapid expansion in government spending and a contraction in tax revenues. According 
to the endogenous growth theory, fiscal imbalances when contained and lowered by 
reducing public expenditures or raising revenue can help improve economic growth 
(Ghura, 1998). To maintain fiscal deficits at a reasonable level many countries have 
resorted to massive cuts to their spending in many sectors of their economy. At the same 
time spending are needed for example in institutional infrastructure in order to attract 
private investors and sustain economic growth. Therefore the resort to tax revenue seems 
unavoidable as part of policy tools that many governments utilize to mobilize resources 
in order to provide for public goods and services. This is the case because other sources 
of revenues such as debts or natural resources are not sustainable in the long term. To 
meet those ends countries also rely increasingly on resource mobilization at domestic and 
international levels. But different factors come into play in order to effectively levy taxes 
and reach the taxation target. These factors include for instance the level of development 
proxy by GDP per capita, the structure of the economy, different constraints on the tax 
system, etc. Economic development also goes along with increased demand for public 
expenditure (Tanzi, 1987). Surprisingly, despite all these challenges encountered to 
mobilize tax revenues countries enter into tax treaties that ultimately result in loss of tax 
revenues. 
 According to the International Tax Glossary, tax treaty is an agreement signed 
between two or more countries for the avoidance of double taxation. Double Tax Treaties 
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(DTTs) generally involve two independent tax jurisdictions that desire to harmonize their 
tax system with respect of the taxation of their national companies operating in the 
territory of the other treaty partner. The intended purpose for capital-importing countries, 
which is to attract massive foreign direct investment, generally ends up being marginal 
or inexistent as evidenced by many studies. The findings as to the effects of DTTs on FDI 
vary greatly depending on the use of aggregate FDI or bilateral FDI as dependent variable. 
Additionally to the inconclusive effect of DTTs on FDI, Easson (2000) argues that DTTs 
lead to a loss of tax revenue due to the asymmetry of treaty partners in terms of inflows 
of foreign investments especially in the case of tax treaties involving capital-exporter 
countries and developing countries. 
Several studies have examined questions related to tax revenue (as a share of GDP) 
in connection with different outcomes of the economy. Very few papers in the economics 
literature have examined the determinants of tax revenues and most of these studies have 
focused on developing countries. Also the literature on the effects of DTTs on the 
economy is very limited. The rare papers that dealt with questions related to tax treaties 
are mainly concerned with their effects on foreign investments. To the best of my 
knowledge this paper is the first to empirically investigate the effect of double tax treaties 
on tax revenues. This paper envisions shedding more light on this question that has been 
long raised in the field of international taxation but has never been subject to any 
investigations on the empirical ground. 
I use a panel data of 37 countries over the period 1990-2010 to investigate the nature 
of the effects of tax treaties on tax revenues. Controlling for the potential determinants of 
tax revenues, I expect to uncover the true causal effects of tax treaties on tax revenues. 
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Using a fixed effect and system GMM estimation methodology, the preliminary results 
show a positive and significant effect of tax treaties on tax revenues followed by a 
negative and significant effect as more tax treaties are concluded. The results also reveal 
that the effects of tax treaties are not contemporaneous and there is at least on year lag 
before the effects set in.  
The rest of the paper is organized as followed. Section 2 gives a general background on 
double tax treaties. Sections 3 and 4 deal with recent developments on tax treaties and the 
determinants of tax revenues. In section 5, I explain the methodology used to explore 
question at hand. Section 6 and 7 discuss the results and conclusions. 
3.2 Background on Double Tax Treaties 
3.2.1 Brief history on Double Tax Treaties 
Tax treaties made their appearance during the period following the World War I as a 
result of a rapidly growing cross-border investment and trade. At that time countries feel 
the need to negotiate bilateral tax treaties with other countries to assist in the avoidance 
of double taxation stemming from international transactions. Following the 1920 Brussels 
International conference, the League of Nations undertook the investigations of juridical 
double taxation problems. The report on Double Taxation prepared by a small group of 
fiscal economists will form the first draft of model tax treaty published in 1928. As result, 
a large network of tax treaties will emerge. This first draft limited in scope had been 
further expanded beginning in 1929 by a Fiscal Committee put in place by the League of 
Nations.  Subsequent conferences held in Mexico City in 1940 and 1943 will yield what 
is become known as the “Mexico draft”. One important feature that is at stake in the 
negotiation of the tax treaty is the allocation of the primary taxing jurisdiction. In fact the 
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extent to which the host country forgoes its taxing rights will ultimately determine the 
magnitude of loss of tax revenues. The Mexico draft will temporally decide in favor of 
developing countries by attributing the primary taxing jurisdiction to the country of 
source of income. This decision will be changed three years later during the revision held 
in London in 1946, which will switch back the taxing jurisdiction to country of residence 
of the tax payer in the “London draft”. In spite of the shortcomings of the Mexico and 
London drafts, the principles embedded in these models will be followed by several 
countries for about a decade (1946-1955) due to the increasing interconnexion of 
economies and the need for harmonization of taxing rules, definitions and methodologies. 
Under the United Nations that succeeded the League of Nations in 1945, a new council 
has been formed that undertook a revision of the London draft. Following the failure of 
the council established by the United Nation to significantly improve the existing draft, 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation33 (OEEC) took over the work. In 
1956 the Fiscal Committee established by the OEEC worked on a draft of a bilateral tax 
treaty that all members would agree upon.   
3.2.2 From the OECD Tax Treaty to the UN Tax Treaty 
The OECD draft published in 1963, as designed, was favorably biased towards developed 
countries. This is not surprising due to the fact that the great majority of the 34 OECD 
countries are developed and capital exporters. This explains why the first draft of OECD 
tax treaty echoes the interests of OECD members by allocating taxing rights to the country 
of residence of the taxpayer. After several years of application and many revisions, the 
final version of the OECD Tax treaty model was published in 1977. One of the 
                                                 
33 The OEEC became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1960. 
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characteristics of the OECD model was that it is more suitable for tax agreement 
negotiation between developed countries. 
Despite the success noticed in eliminating double taxation with the OECD model, 
only a handful of tax treaties would be concluded between developed and developing 
countries. Given that developing countries are mostly capital importing countries, the way 
the OECD model was designed could only produce unequal results for developing 
countries because of the loss of tax revenues incurred. In response to the deliberately 
biased OECD tax treaty model, the developing countries will seek to develop their own 
model treaty. Under the leadership of the United Nation, an Ad Hoc Group of Experts 
from developed and developing countries was formed in 1968 to develop a more suitable 
model tax treaty between developed and developing countries. Along with some 
international organizations34 the ad hoc group will publish a manual for the Negotiation 
of Bilateral tax Treaties between developed and developing countries, followed by the 
first model of UN tax treaty model published in 1980. It is worth noting that despite their 
differences the UN model utilized the 1977 OECD model as a reference. Expectedly the 
UN model allocated more rights to tax to capital importing countries and developing 
countries with specific emphasis on passive investment income and business income. The 
UN model has gone under various revisions and the last revision was done in 2011. 
3.2.3 US Tax Treaty and Other Tax Treaty Models 
In 1935 the United States signed with France an income tax treaty. This treaty, based on 
unofficial model, is considered to be the first tax treaty signed by US (Zarb, 2011). The 
                                                 
34 International Organizations that took to the discussion include International Monetary Fund, 
International Fiscal Affaire Association, OECD, Organization of American States, and International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
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treaty signed between US and UK in 1945 was also based on unofficial model that served 
for the subsequent treaty negotiations. In 1976, the US Treasury Department has 
developed the first official treaty model to use for tax treaty negotiations. Five years later, 
a model of Income Tax Convention dealing with “treaty shopping” was published in 
1981, which would be replaced by another version in 1992. This version of the US tax 
treaty model has gone through different revisions until 1996.  In November 2006, the US 
treasury has released the United States Model Income Tax Convention and Model 
Technical Explanations.  Comparable to the OECD model in structure and terminology, 
the US model reflects the interests of the United States and allocates the taxing rights to 
US. 
It’s frequent to note that even some developed countries would use the OECD model as 
a starting point and then depart from that on some specific aspects. Also some countries 
members of the OECD have expressed some reservations with regard to some rules of 
the OECD model. This justifies why some countries make changes to account for their 
own economic interests and in accordance of their domestic law. Beside the US, countries 
such as Belgium, Netherlands and Russia have their own tax treaty as well. The general 
intent of these treaties is to indicate to probable tax treaty partners their stance on specific 
tax matters.  
3.2.4 Consequences of Double Tax Treaties 
Double taxation can be harmful to economic activity in the sense that it can negatively 
affect the flow of foreign investment coming into a country. To paraphrase Egger (2006), 
“one of the most visible obstacles to cross-border investment is the double taxation of 
foreign-earned income”. In addition to reducing the likelihood of double taxation, double 
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tax treaties can help lower uncertainty that potential investors might experience with 
regard to the foreign tax systems by setting the rules, standardizing and harmonizing the 
definitions and calculations of taxes. Also, implementation of double tax treaties is often 
interpreted as willingness for contracting countries to create the fiscally facile 
environment necessary for prosperous business operation by potential investors. There 
are also some costs associated with double tax treaties. When the tax treaty grants the 
residence country with the jurisdiction to tax or if it cuts down the tax rates of the host 
country, this will result in a reduction in the amount of tax revenue collected by the host 
country. To make matters worse there is no guarantee that the tax rate cut will induce the 
expected inflows of foreign investments. Instead it only shifts the tax revenue from one 
country to another. There is no clear finding as to the effects of DTTs on FDI. In the 
context of the United States, Blonigen and Davies (2004) find little evidence that DTTs 
have improved US FDI over the period1980-1999. Neumayer (2006) show that the FDI 
inflows to developing countries have been increased as a result of the DTTs signed with 
the US and other capital exporter countries.  
Also resulting from the conclusion of a DTT is the decline in tax receipts the home 
country might incur subsequent to low tax rates imposed on investments. Additionally, 
there are some administrative costs incurred by the contracting parties related to the 
negotiation and the ratification of the treaty convention. These tax agreements will 
generally be signed at the expense of the financial sovereignty of the contracting parties. 
Reciprocal features exist in Double Tax Treaties in the sense that a contracting country 
can simultaneously act as a source and a home country. In the case of DTTs between two 
developed countries, the benefits gained by investors can be offset by the benefits offered 
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to investors of the host countries in the home countries. But in the case of DTTs between 
developed and developing countries this outcome needs not hold because of the 
asymmetry of foreign investment flow. The resulting effect of DTTs for developing 
countries is likely to be a loss of tax revenue. Easson (2000) first put forth the idea that 
tax treaties lead to loss tax revenue when the treaty partners are asymmetrical in terms of 
investments. In the same vein Chisik and Davies (2004) note that tax treaties rates tend 
to fall over time and most governments tax the income generated by foreign firms through 
the so-called withholding tax on repatriation. The withholding tax rates decided in the tax 
treaties are generally identical for the treaty partners. These authors argue that the 
incremental decline in the tax rates is preferable to an application of the lowest tax rates 
at the beginning of the tax treaty because lower tax rates are not “self-enforcing”. Further, 
they note that the irreversible characteristic of bilateral FDI makes the gradual decrease 
in tax rates more desirable in order to have a retaliation tool to deter any sort of deviance 
from one of the contracting partners. They also claim that tax treaty partners could reach 
a Pareto-optimal tax rates in a dynamic setting in the long run contingent upon the 
asymmetry in FDI flows of the partners. Interestingly the authors note that it is less likely 
that a tax treaty will be signed between two countries that differ significantly in terms of 
FDI flows (asymmetry of FDI). This finding is a perfect illustration of the disadvantage 
in which developing countries find themselves when they conclude tax treaties with 
developed countries that are mostly capital exporters. The revenue sharing conflict that 
might result in case of tax treaties involving developing and developed countries is less 
acute in the case of tax treaties between developed countries. This disadvantage is 
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alleviated in the UN model tax treaties that grant taxation jurisdiction to host countries 
contrary to the OECD model  
Not only costs are associated with tax treaties; there also some benefits associated 
with the signing of DTTs. Entering a Tax Treaty can help reduce tax evasion when 
contracting parties share information and will ultimately reduce the administrative costs 
incurred with tax enforcement and tax collection. This is true under the assumption that 
each party has the incentive to cooperate mutually with other countries by providing them 
with the information and mutual assistance needed as often stated in tax treaties. First and 
foremost, tax treaties when concluded along with reasonable tax rates and an upfront 
clarification of potential divergences with domestic tax laws can create a safe and friendly 
business environment for potential investors. Sometimes treaties may constitute a step 
toward an establishment of good international and diplomatic relations with other 
countries. 
3.3 Double Tax Treaties: Definitions – Functions - Recent Developments 
3.3.1 Definition and Functions of Double Tax Treaties 
Double Tax Treaty (DTT) refers to an agreement signed between two sovereign countries 
to avoid double taxation. DTTs are believed to achieve the following purposes: (i) reduce 
or eliminate double taxation of the same tax payer, (ii) promote commerce and investment 
at the international level, (iii) provide a fair share of tax revenues between the contracting 
parties and (iv) combat fiscal fraud and tax evasion. Subsequent to the preceding purposes 
of DTTs, the following key functions are commonly associated with DTTs. I will focus 
on the main functions that DTTs perform, as found in the literature.  
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The first main function of DTTs is the standardization of tax definition in the 
jurisdictions of contracting countries. It’s important to note that with the advent of 
globalization cross-boarder investments are now taking place either under international 
enterprises or multinational enterprise. The later operates through a subsidiary company 
located in the source country while the former operates through “a Permanent 
Establishment” in the host country (source country). Host countries generally tax income 
or profits that foreign or multinational companies generate within their territory. 
Harmonization of definition is therefore important in the sense that any divergence in the 
way countries view and define the concept of “permanent establishment” will generally 
result in double taxation and render capital flows ineffective as well. In general, domestic 
laws of most host countries provide conditions governing taxation of income or profits 
generated on their soil by foreign or multinational companies. Additionally any existing 
tax treaty between the two countries will then apply to envisage the possibility of tax 
relief. According to Article 7 (1) of the OECD model of Tax Treaty business profits 
earned in a source country should be taxed only in the residence country unless the 
taxpayer has a PE in the source country through which the profits were made. Under the 
OECD model, the concept of PE is defined according to a “basic-rule” PE, a construction 
PE and an agency PE. The UN model of Tax Treaty contrary to the OECD model expands 
the scope of PE and attributes greater taxing rights to the source state (Art.5). Another 
difference from the Article 7 of the OECD model is the so-called “limited force of 
attraction rule” which provides taxation of profits related to sales of similar goods or 
merchandise in the source country.  
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Another objective that DTTs can achieve is the reduction of transfer pricing35 and the 
elimination of tax avoidance. In fact some multinational firms have tendency to 
exaggerate their costs (lower profits) and manipulate their prices in order to transfer 
revenue to low tax locations. Taxing authorities of the contracting states of a tax treaty 
can set rules to combat this phenomenon. The typical way of dealing with the transfer 
pricing issue in a treaty is to put in a place a method for the determination of a price close 
to the market price that would be charged to a third party or independent customer in a 
similar transaction (arm’s length market value). By the same token additional rules are 
put in place to allocate income, also to resolve potential conflicts between concerned 
parties on the other. The ultimate goal here is to create an environment with tax certainty 
for firms to conduct business in. These agendas are also aided by the promotion of 
exchange of tax information and collection assistance in the rules. There are generally 
two types of information exchange, broad or large, depending on the tax treaty model. 
Exchange of information can be mutually beneficial for both contracting states in the 
sense that it can help reduce the costs incurred by tax authorities for tax enforcement. 
Avoidance of treaty shopping is another objective that tax authorities of different 
countries are concerned with. Treaty shopping occurs when firms seek to the maximize 
benefits from DTT provisions in a conspicuous manner. It refers to “a situation where a 
person who is not entitled to the benefits of a tax treaty makes use of an individual or a 
legal person to obtain those treaty benefits that are not available directly” (Rogers-
Glabush J, 2009). Tax treaties through tax coordination by capital exporting countries can 
                                                 
35 Transfer pricing is the setting of the price for Goods, Services and intangible property bought and sold 
between associated enterprises, or between different parts of the same enterprise located in different 
jurisdictions (K. Homes, International Tax policy and Double Tax Treaties 2014, page 214) 
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help achieve this goal. The typical rule is that, when more than half of a corporation’s 
stock is controlled by a third country’s residents, treaty benefits should be to limited 
(Doernberg, 1997). Since treaty shopping ultimately erodes domestic tax bases, countries 
are now introducing provisions in their domestic laws and DTTs to prevent companies 
from shopping for tax treaties. The issue of treaty shopping has been a major concern for 
U.S. authorities who have recently revised previous tax treaties with their partners. Lastly, 
and perhaps the most important, function of DTTs is to eliminate international double 
taxation via the rules in the treaties that affect withholding taxes collected on foreign 
investment benefits.  
3.3.2 Trends and Recent Developments on Double Tax Treaties. 
The first few tax treaties signed were among continental European countries in the 1945. 
Since the introduction of the first Tax Treaty in 1899, the number of DTTs concluded has 
been growing steadily. Approximately 70 DTTs were concluded by 1945 following the 
establishment of the new OEEC model tax treaty. The World Investment Report (1998) 
had estimated the total number of DTTs to 1794 covering almost 180 countries. By that 
time many European countries (UK, France and others) were already very active in DTT 
signing. For instance, France had signed tax treaty with more than 100 countries. The 
expansion of DTT conclusion has gone through different paces. In the 1960s about an 
average of 18 DTTs was signed annually while the annual averages of DTTs concluded 
in the 1980s and 1990s reached 58 and 80 respectively. An annual average of 92 DTTs 
was signed more recently during the period 2004-2007. A total number of 2,805 DTTs 
was signed by 2008 compared to a total of 1,844 DTTs that had been signed by the end 
1998 involving 182 countries (UNCTAD IIA MONITOR No. 3).  There are actually more 
116 
than 3,000 DTTs in force worldwide and about 84 DTTs were signed in 2014 (WIR 
2015). A comprehensive worldwide network of tax treaties would require between 16,000 
and 18,000 DTTs depending on the number of independent tax authorities. 
The majority of DTTs are signed between developed countries while very few tax 
agreements are established between developed and developing countries. Easson (2000) 
notes that one could characterize the expansion of Tax treaties in three waves. Until the 
1970s tax treaties were mostly signed among developed countries. Also developing 
countries have also been active in signing tax agreements among themselves, but in a 
lower degree. Countries in Africa and Asia had entered into tax agreements around 1970 
with the intent to attract considerable amount of FDI. In the 1980s some socialist 
countries made their entrance into DTTs negotiation and the 1990s saw the appearance 
of transition economies and newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The 
Latin American and Middle East countries seem to belong to the last wave of countries 
to come to the tax treaty arena.   
Even though the United States has developed its tax treaty model lately compared to 
OECD and UN models, it has been very active in DTTs signing. As of December 1998, 
the U.S. and U.K. topped the list of developed countries that signed the most DTTs, 
followed by France, Sweden, and Luxembourg. Compared to other developed countries, 
the U.S. has created very few treaties with other developed countries, even fewer with 
developing countries. Developing countries have not been indolent in signing DTTs. 
Between 2005 and 2006, about one third of all DTTs concluded were among developing 





3.4 Determinants of Tax Revenue 
In the economic literature very few papers have investigated the determinants of tax 
revenue. The rare papers that examined the question have focused on developing 
countries. Lotz and Morss (1967) is one of the first papers dealing with issue related to 
tax revenues. Analyzing the tax efforts they find that income per capita and openness to 
trade measured by the sum of imports and exports in percent of GNP have a positive and 
significant effect on tax ratios (defined as tax revenues over GNP) for low-income 
countries while the same two variables appear insignificant in the contest of high-income 
countries. In the same vein, Chelliah et al. (1975) built on a previous study by Chelliah 
(1971) to explore the tax ratios and tax efforts in developing countries. The authors note 
that income level, degree of openness and the structure of the economy (i.e GDP 
composition) are great explanatory variables choice in evaluating the tax effort of 
developing countries. They argue that the mining and agricultural sectors seem to play a 
major factor in explaining the tax ratios although the agricultural was found difficult to 
levy tax on. Also, many other authors (Bah 1971; Tait et al. 1979) came to a comparable 
conclusion.  Piancasteli (2001) appears to be one the rare studies that expanded the sample 
of countries to include developed countries. He confirms that variables such as income 
per capita, openness to trade and share of agricultural sector in GDP are determinant in 
explaining tax ratios while mining sector share in GDP and quasi-money (M2) appear 
insignificant.  
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With respect to Openness to trade, Tupy (2005) notes that the average rate of applied 
tariffs rate has been in decline since the mid-1980s and argue that not all countries are 
equally equipped to take full advantage of the benefits from trade liberalization and 
middle-income countries are the great beneficiaries of trade liberalization. This remark 
may justify Baunsgaard and keen’s findings that openness affects differently countries 
depending on their level of development. In fact Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) found a 
positive and significant effect of openness on tax revenue for middle and low-income 
countries while a negative and insignificant effect is uncovered for high-income 
countries. 
In addition to these traditional determinants of tax revenues, an important element to 
account for is the macroeconomic environment in which tax revenues are collected. In 
fact, inflation may have a negative effect on tax revenues because an inflationary 
environment will more likely cause businesses or households to transfer their wealth to 
less taxable assets and avoid the negative effects of inflation. Tanzi (1977) argues that 
there are many channels through which inflation may cause a reduction in tax revenues: 
lagged tax payments, excise taxes on different products, and a reduction in the tax base. 
Also, the financial development of a country measured by its degree of monetization 
reflects the extent of the money-based transactions and hence an important source of tax 
revenues in a modern economy. Tanzi (1992), examining developing countries during the 
period 1978/88 argues that in addition to inflation, other macroeconomics conditions such 
as disequilibria in the balance of payments had negatively affected the tax revenues in 
years subsequent to 1982. Furthermore he argues that, in order for developing countries 
to adequately service debts they might resort to taxation. This justifies why the debts level 
119 
might also be a potential determinant of tax revenue. The author also argues that the 
explanations as to why agricultural sector affects taxation might reside in supply and 
demand sides. More agricultural sector tends to phase with fewer public spending and 
therefore less need for taxation. The sector is already subject to massive indirect taxation 
so that possibilities for explicit taxes are very slim.  As a result, Tanzi notes that the share 
of agriculture in GDP should be negative associated with tax revenue.   
Also factors such as institutional quality of countries are believed to significantly 
influence tax revenue. For instance, Ghura (1998) argues that factors such as structural 
reforms, government’s provisions of public goods, corruption, and external environment 
(captured by debt and grants in percentage of GDP) may explain tax revenues. He found 
strong evidence that structural reforms have a positive and significant effect on tax 
revenues, while the level of corruption has a significant deterring effect on tax revenues. 
Many other studies have investigated the effects of a specific variable of interest on 
tax revenues. In the same vein, Leuthold (1991) found that the variable, grants and gifts, 
in percentage of GDP has a positive and significant effect on tax revenues. In an extended 
regression, Clist and Morrissey (2011) found that loans have a positive and significant 
effect on tax revenues across all specifications and time period estimations, while the 
effect of grants on tax revenue shift from significant and negative to positive and 
significant (or insignificant) depending on the sub-period considered. They found no 
evidence that the shift in the sign of the relationship between grants and tax revenue is 
due to a time effect. They did find some evidence of a break for the post 1984 period. 
Also, Baunsgaard and keen (2010) analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on tax 
revenue controlled for value added tax (VAT). They found that countries that have VAT 
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in place recover more strongly from the loss of tax revenue due to trade liberalization. 
Related to the same topic is the study by Keen and Lockwood in 2010 that pointed out 
that, adding a VAT dummy variable to the tax effort equation yields a positive and 
significant effect on tax revenue in percentage of GDP. 
3.5 Data and Methodology 
3.5.1 FDI and Tax Treaties in OECD countries 
The objective in this paper is to investigate whether tax treaties lead to a loss of tax 
revenues in OECD countries. The main argument rests on the fact that if treaty partners 
present some asymmetry in terms of FDI a tax treaty will lead to a loss of tax revenue 
(Easson, 2000). In this section I look in detail at the FDI inflows of all countries in the 
sample to see if there is any asymmetry in the FDI data over the period 1990-2010. 
Figures 1 and 2 below show the total FDI inflows.  
Among the countries in the sample, the United States (25.66%), UK (12.14%), 
Belgium (6.51%), Germany (6.39%), and Netherland (4.98%) represent the top 5 in terms 
of countries that receive the most of foreign investment over the period 1990-2010. The 
United States alone has received more than 25% of all total FDI inflows and these top 5 
countries combined accounted for over 55% of total inward FDI during the same period. 
This means that the top 5 countries received more than hath of the total FDI coming to 
the region while the remaining 32 countries share less than half of the total FDI inflow.  
In terms of FDI outflow the top 5 countries which are the United States (22.84%), UK 
(12.95%), Germany (8.55%), France (8.46%) and Netherland (6.32%) amounted about 
60% of total FDI outwards. These figures clearly show that very few countries (five or 
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less) share the great majority of FDI inflows and outflows in the sample while the bulk 
of the countries in the sample share only a small portion of the investments. 
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Figure 3. 1Total FDI inflows over the period 1990-2010 
 
Figure 3. 2 Distribution of countries by DTTs 
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Figure 2 above presents some countries from the sample by importance in terms of 
the total number of DTTs signed. The top five countries that are more prolific in signing 
DTTs are Poland (57), Bulgaria (56), South Africa (54), Spain (52) and Latvia (50). It 
also shows that developed countries such as US, UK are not necessarily dominant in terms 
of DTTs signed as they ended up at the queue of the distribution on the graph even though 
they attract a large amount of FDI as shown in figure 1. There seems to be no correlation 
between the level of development and the number of DTTs signed on the one hand, also 
between the amount of FDI and the number of DTTs concluded on the other hand. One 
thing that strikes out from comparing figures 1 and 2 is that the distribution of the number 
of tax treaties signed by countries seems less asymmetric compared to the distribution of 
FDI. 
3.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The data on control variables are collected from the World Development Indicators 
database and the data on Double Tax Treaties are compiled from the UNCTAD website. 
The dependent variable as mentioned above is the tax revenue. The tax revenue is made 
up of tax on income, profits and capital gains, which is levied on individuals and 
corporates. The independent variables include agricultural, industrial values added in 
percentage of GDP, openness to trade (sum of import and export values in percentage of 
GDP), GDP per capita in constant price of 2005, inflation, and Value added tax (VAT). 
To create the DTT variables I undertook the daunting task of enumerating all the tax 
treaties signed by OECD countries by exploiting the country specific pdf files publically 
124 
published on UNCTAD website. These files provide an exhaustive list of tax treaties on 
income and capital that each country had signed worldwide up until 2010. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for a sample of 37 countries over the period 
1990-2010. Tax revenue (in level), the dependent variable, presents a minimum value of 
0.0003 and a maximum of 2,96058.5 billion dollars, and the mean value is 1,7736.82 
billion dollars. Denmark is the country with the highest tax receipts in percent of GDP 
while Chile is the one with the lowest tax revenue in percent of GDP. The minimum 
inflation is about -9.62, which represents the inflation rate in Lesotho in 2001. Peru with 
an inflation rate of 7481.66 in 1990 has the highest inflation rate. The average value of 
inflow of foreign investment is 14393.49 million of dollars US. Ireland registered the 
highest disinvestment (of -31689.30 million of dollars US) in 2005 while US had the 
highest inflow of investment (314007.00 million of dollars US) in 2000. The variable of 
interest which is DTTs has an average of 1.53, meaning that over the period 1990-2010 a 
typical country in the sample has signed in average at least one tax treaty with other 
countries worldwide. The weighted version of the variable of interest is DTTsW which is 
defined as DTTs times the share of FDI inflows in the total world FDI inflows. The 
minimum value -0.07 of the weighted DTTsW results from the negative FDI inflow 
registered in the FDI inflow variable. The dependent variable in this setting is the total 
tax revenue in level. It includes all levels of tax: taxes on income, profits, capital gains; 
taxes on Goods and Services; Social Security Contribution; taxes on payroll and 




Table 3. 1 Descriptive statistics, 1990-2010 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dep. Vars Tax_Rev                                     
(in % of GDP) 
777 25.81 7.67 9.36 58.73 
 
Tax_lev                                  
(in Billions $ US ) 
777 17736.82 37021.45 0.0003 296058.5 
Expl. Vars DTTs 777 1.53 1.72 0 10 
 DTTsW 777 0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.76 
 AGRI 777 4.41 4.92 0.04 40.98 
 INDU 777 29.19 5.88 12.81 49.20 
 OPEN 777 91.23 66.58 15.16 439.66 
 GDPpc_2005 777 24998.90 18317.67 510.67 87772.69 
 
Pop                                               
(in Millions) 
777 32.10 55.50 0.22 309.00 
 Infl 777 30.97 311.10 -9.62 7481.66 
 
Fdi_in                                            
(in Millions $ US ) 
777 14393.49 32768.45 -31689.30 314007.00 
 
Fdi_out                                      
(in Millions $ US ) 
777 18075.33 40387.73 -35783.18 393518.00 
  VAT 777 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Notes: Tax_Rev refers to the tax revenue in percentage of GDP and Tax_lev  refers to  
the total amount of tax revenue in level in billions of US dollars. 
 
3.5.3 Methodological Approach 
Several authors (Sen Gupta, 2007; Baunsgaard et al. 2010) have explored issues related 
to tax revenues using a dynamic panel data methodology. For instance, Baunsgaard et al. 
(2010) investigated the impact of trade liberalization on domestic tax revenues in a 
dynamic panel data setting. Adopting a similar approach I analyze the effects of double 
tax treaties on tax revenues. Controlling for the habitual determinants of tax revenues as 
found in the literature, I expect to uncover whether Tax Treaties have any effects on tax 
revenues.  The sample data will include 37 countries over the period 1990-2010. The 
choice of this time period is essentially driven by data availability on DTTs and the 
sample countries are chosen on the basis of ease data collection on tax revenue of good 




𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑘𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                    (1) 
Where 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑡−𝑘 = 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑡−𝑘 ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑡−𝑘 ∗ (𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡/𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑡) is the 
ratio of FDI inflow of country i in a year t over the world FDI inflows in a year t; i= 
1,…,N and t = 1,…,T and 𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents the amount (in US dollars) of total tax 
revenue collected by a country i in a year t, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the set of control variables including 
GDP per capita (at 2005 US dollar price), Openness to trade (sum of import and export 
in percentage of GDP), AGR (value added from the agricultural sector), IND (value added 
from the industrial sector), inflation (annual variation in consumer price index). I also 
include VAT (Value-added tax) which is dummy variable taking 1 if a country i has a 
VAT in place in year t. 
𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑖𝑡−𝑘 is the number of tax treaties that a country i has signed in period t-k for 
k=0,1…,K where K is the lag length. The weight W is introduced to account for the fact 
that the amount of FDI generated in a country in a year is likely the result of current or 
previous tax treaties signed; the parameters of main interest are 𝛾𝑘 and I expect the 
remaining parameters related to the control variables to take on values consistent with 
what i described in the literature review. The parameters 𝛾𝑘 describe the impact of 
weighted tax treaties on log of tax revenue levels. The contemporaneous effect of 
weighted tax treaties is captured 𝛾0 and the parameters 𝛾𝑘 capture the lagged effects of 
weighted tax treated on tax revenue. The variable 𝜇𝑖 denotes the individual fixed effects 
while 𝜗𝑡  captures temporal shocks and 𝑖𝑡 the idiosyncratic error terms.  
The introduction of the lagged dependent variable plays at least two major roles in 




common in tax revenue studies to note a serial correlation in the error terms revealing 
that revenue performance is highly persistent overtime. Therefore the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable allows alleviating the serial correlation issue. Second, the 
introduction of the lagged tax revenues allows for plausible dynamics in policy 
adjustment (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). 
Drawing from the literature review I expect per capita GPD to have a positive effect 
on tax revenue. Higher economic performance should translate into higher tax revenues.  
The variable AGR is expected to have a negative effect on tax revenue due to the 
difficulty of raising additional explicit tax form the agricultural sector. Since the industrial 
sector is more organized, it is more easy collect tax on. Therefore, I expect a positive 
effect on tax revenue of the variable IND. The effect of openness to trade on tax revenues 
is not clear-cut in the literature and largely depends on the level of development of 
countries. Baunsgaard et al, (2010) found a positive and significant effect of openness on 
tax revenues for low and middle-income countries while a negative and insignificant 
effect is found for high-income countries. Consequently, I expect a negative effect of 
openness to trade on tax revenue. Inflation is expected to have a negative effect on tax 
revenues. In an inflationary environment, firms and households may develop strategies 
to counter the corrosive effect on their wealth.   
With respect to the expected sign of the variable of interest (DTTs) on tax revenue 
the main argument rests on Easson’s view that tax treaty leads a loss in tax revenues in 
developing countries where the asymmetry with the developed countries is very marked 




asymmetry in terms of inflows of FDI of countries included in the sample. Therefore it is 
reasonable to expect a loss of tax revenues as well. 
There are some issues surrounding the estimation of equation (1). First, there is a 
possibility that the unobserved individual characteristics 𝜇𝑖 might be correlated with the 
observed characteristics𝑍𝑖𝑡. There may be some time-invariant variables such as the legal 
tax system that is correlated with the export revenues for example or other covariates. 
Secondly, some of the variables in the specification are macroeconomic series; there is a 
possibility of non-stationarity of those variables. To get around those issues, it will be 
more appropriate to estimate equation (1) in differences, which gives the following 
specification; 
∆𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽∆𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑘∆𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + ∆𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + ∆𝜗𝑡
+ ∆ 𝑖𝑡                        (2) 
Also there is an endogeneity issue in estimating equations (1) and (2). It could be 
easily argued that there exists a feedback effect between tax revenue and per capita GDP. 
Great economic performance should create greater conditions to levy more tax revenue 
(and vice versa). Additionally, Egger et al. (2006) analyzing the effect of tax treaties on 
foreign investments pointed out that countries enter into tax agreements if doing so is 
mutually beneficial to treaty partners in terms of welfare gains. They conclude that tax 
treaty should be considered endogenous at least on the general equilibrium analysis 
ground. To account for endogeneity issues, I employ the system GMM methodology that 
uses the lagged variables as instruments. Since one of the purposes of tax treaty is to 
attract foreign direct investment, one can reasonably argue that a tax treaty signed for 




FDI between the two countries. Therefore instead of using just the number of tax treaties 
signed by a country in a given year as variable of interest, the interest should be on the 
number of tax treaties weighted by the inflow of FDI. In addition to the possibility of 
having a contemporaneous effect of tax treaties in the economy, it is likely to also have 
lagged effects. I will explore different lags of weighted DTTs in my investigations. 
3.6 Estimation Results  
3.6.1 Preliminary Results 
I started out by investigating the effect on total tax revenues (in level) of weighted tax 
treaties (DTTsW) of countries that have concluded tax treaties with other countries 
regardless of the origin of the foreign contracting partners. The dependent variable here 
is the log of total tax revenue beforehand expressed in billions of US dollars and the 
variable of interest is the weighted DTTs signed in any given year (DTTsW). To decide 
between the random effect and the fixed effect estimations I performed the Hausman test 
and the results36 decide in favor of a fixed effect model. Since a contemporaneous effect 
of tax treaties on tax revenue seems less realistic, I explored the effect of different lags of 
weighted tax treaties on total tax revenue (at least 5 lags up to 10 will be considered). 
Contrary to most previous studies37 that failed to find a positive effect of GDP on tax 
revenue, the results show a positive and highly significant effect of GDP per capita at 
constant price of year 2005 on tax revenue. The results also show a negative and highly 
significant effect of log of openness to trade on log tax revenue. This finding may seem 
                                                 
36 By choice the Hausman test results are not reported. 





surprising at first, but previous studies have not reached a consensus as to whether more 
openness leads to more tax revenue. Openness is defined as the sum of import and export 
in percentage of GDP. The negative and significant effect of openness on tax revenue 
may be indicative of the reduction of tariffs or trade barriers, which in turn lowers tax 
revenue. This result is consistent with Baunsgaard and Keen (2010). With respect to 
inflation, the results show a negative and highly significant effect on tax revenue 
reflecting thus the adverse effects of higher inflation in the SGMM estimation (see 
column 6 of table 2). 
The other control variables, shares of agriculture and industrial in percentage of GDP, 
have the expected signs. The agricultural share has a negative and significant effect on 
Tax revenue in the FE estimation. This is consistent with Tanzi’s (1992) view that 
countries with large share of agricultural sector are likely to be associated with less need 
of government spending. Also not surprisingly, the share of industry has a positive and 






Table 3. 2 Fixed Effects and SGMM estimation results with different lags 
  
logTaxLev (t) 
 FE Estimations    SGMM Estimations 















logTaxLev_1 0.658*** 0.0123*** 0.618***  0.798*** 0.706*** 0.0109*** 0.665*** 
 (0.00370) (0.0268) (0.0599)  (0.0428) (0.0570) (0.128) (0.239) 
DTTsW 
0.153*** 0.187*** 0.140***  0.480*** 0.491** 1.887*** 1.060* 
 (0.0839) (0.0840) (0.0331)  (0.250) (0.241) (0.594) (0.591) 
logGDPpc05(t) 
0.318** 0.810*** 0.413**  0.185*** 0.284*** 1.008*** 0.330*** 
 (0.126) (0.227) (0.175)  (0.0482) (0.0662) (0.139) (0.251) 
logAGRI(t) 0.101 -0.200*** -0.0919  -0.0118 -0.00976 0.00943 0.00934 
 (0.151) (0.0731) (0.0589)  (0.0164) (0.0241) (0.0724) (0.0208) 
logIND(t) 0.287* 0.666*** 0.444***  0.0801** 0.128** 0.329** 0.127 
 (0.155) (0.237) (0.141)  (0.0359) (0.0508) (0.128) (0.0788) 
logOPEN(t) -0.271** -0.452*** -0.240**  -0.0618** -0.0822** -0.208** -0.0808 
 (0.115) (0.140) (0.103)  (0.0290) (0.0368) (0.0955) (0.0557) 
Infl(t) -0.00261 -0.00983 -0.283  -0.00682 -0.00408 -0.0549*** -0.0202* 
 (0.00619) (0.00945) (0.280)  (0.00674) (0.00602) (0.0173) (0.0117) 
VAT(t) 0.0584 0.166** 0.109  0.0728** 0.0638 0.223** 0.118** 
 (0.0794) (0.0771) (0.0718)  (0.0336) (0.0551) (0.112) (0.0498) 
logPop(t) -0.192 -0.507 0.156  0.172*** 0.256*** 0.903*** 0.297 
 (0.201) (0.370) (0.222)  (0.0464) (0.0637) (0.138) (0.221) 
Constant 3.396* 10.11*** 0.0699  -0.541** -0.963** -3.583*** -1.179 
 (1.851) (3.410) (1.982)  (0.271) (0.411) (1.052) (0.947) 
Observations 666 592 481   740 666 592 518 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
# of Country 37 37 37  37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.746 0.920 0.958           
AR(1) P-value         0.303 0.303 0.071 0.007 
AR(2) P-value     0.407 0.218 0.951 0.279 
Over-Identification P-value    0.853 0.888 0.49 0.977 
# of instruments       31 29 27 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
The results above clearly show that weighted tax treaties (DTTsW) have a positive 
and significant effect on log of tax revenue regardless of the estimation methodology 
(Fixed Effects or System GMM). It is also worth mentioning that tax treaties do not affect 
contemporaneously tax revenues and that the effects only appear one year following the 
implementation of tax treaties (see column 4 of the SGMM results in table 2 above). Also, 




These findings are somewhat counterintuitive in the sense that one might reasonably think 
that once treaty partners agree to lower income and profits tax rates to lessen the tax 
burden on foreign investors and avoid double taxation, this will naturally result in a loss 
of tax revenue but the findings seem to say otherwise. 
3.6.2. Diminishing Effect of Double Tax Treaties on Tax Revenues 
In the previous section, I explored the effect of tax treaties on log tax revenues using 
weighted DTTs signed by a country in any given year as variable of interest. But the 
results have not lived up to the expectations that tax treaties are detrimental to tax 
revenues of tax treaty partners.   In this section, I further the investigations by questioning 
whether there is a diminishing effect following the positive effect of tax treaties on tax 
revenues uncovered in the previous section. To do so, I include the square of the weighted 
tax treaty variable in equations (1) and (2). I then estimate the following equation (1’) 
using FE and System GMM. 
𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑘𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾2𝑘𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊𝑠𝑞𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝜇𝑖 +
𝜗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (1′)     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊𝑠𝑞 = 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑊 
Following the results from previous section I expect the parameters 𝛾1𝑘 to be positive 
and if there was any “diminishing effects” the parameters 𝛾2𝑘 should be negative. In fact, 
there is some income and profits tax rates aspects imbedded in tax treaties texts. As more 
and more tax treaties are signed between countries there might be a diminishing effect 
following the positive effect observed. Therefore the link with the Laffer curve with 
respect to the effect that tax treaties have on tax revenue is worth consideration. 
I explored different lags (up to 10 lags) of weighted tax treaties and square of 




where I noticed a significant effect of tax treaty. The results reported on table 3 show that 
while most control variables continue to be significant and have the expected signs, the 
weighted tax treaties variable also continue to have a positive and significant effect on 
tax revenue following the second year of implementation of tax treaty (see column 5 of 
table 3). The results also seem to show that the Laffer effect does not kick in immediately. 
In fact, while the positive effect of tax treaties takes about a year or two to appear, the 
negative effect on the other hand shows up much later. The FE and SGMM estimation 
results show that the diminishing effect of tax treaties on tax revenue takes about five to 
six years to set in. One possible explanation of why tax treaties might positively affect 
tax revenue as opposed to the negative effect foreseen by Easson (2000) is that lowering 
corporation tax rates might actually attract foreign companies. As a result, the surplus of 
profits generated from the tax reduction on income and capital can help build up their 




Table 3. 3 Fixed Effects and SGMM with diminishing effects of DTTs 
  Fixed Effects   System GMM 
logTaxLev 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 (t-3)  (t-6)  (t-7)  (t-8)   (t-2)  (t-3)  (t-5) 
logTaxLev_1 0.659*** 0.668*** 0.650*** 0.615***  0.791*** 0.701*** 0.0173*** 
 (0.00369) (0.0486) (0.0512) (0.0598)  (0.0477) (0.0591) (0.186) 
DTTsW 0.262** 0.213*** 0.209* 0.220***  1.128** 1.298*** 1.209** 
 (0.101) (0.0750) (0.110) (0.0791)  (0.655) (0.459) (0.666) 
DTTsWsq -0.0404 -0.0524** -0.0357*** 
-
0.0315***  -0.309*** -0.252*** -0.399* 
 (0.0240) (0.0205) (0.0125) (0.0260)  (0.247) (0.165) (0.228) 
logGDPpc05 0.314** 0.254 0.304* 0.414**  0.197*** 0.285*** 1.029*** 
 (0.126) (0.153) (0.163) (0.175)  (0.0551) (0.0675) (0.210) 
logAGRI 0.101 -0.0800 -0.0852 -0.0911  -0.00751 -0.0123 0.0175 
 (0.151) (0.0483) (0.0541) (0.0581)  (0.0198) (0.0231) (0.0670) 
logIND 0.291* 0.389*** 0.404*** 0.446***  0.0882*** 0.132*** 0.278** 
 (0.154) (0.131) (0.136) (0.141)  (0.0299) (0.0505) (0.140) 
logOPEN -0.276** -0.175** -0.186* -0.243**  -0.0616** -0.0893** -0.175* 
 (0.113) (0.0837) (0.0921) (0.104)  (0.0293) (0.0363) (0.0985) 
Infl -0.00265 -0.00557 -0.00509 -0.288  -0.00748 -0.00479 -0.0569*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00545) (0.00555) (0.280)  (0.00604) (0.00591) (0.0190) 
VAT 0.0580 0.115* 0.112* 0.106  0.0724 0.0845* 0.172 
 (0.0793) (0.0651) (0.0661) (0.0737)  (0.0531) (0.0510) (0.142) 
logPop -0.187 -0.122 -0.0208 0.154  0.179*** 0.257*** 0.931*** 
 (0.200) (0.186) (0.205) (0.218)  (0.0506) (0.0654) (0.190) 
Constant 3.369* 2.555 1.591 0.123  -0.583* -0.923** -3.823*** 
 (1.843) (1.709) (1.875) (1.955)  (0.310) (0.420) (1.005) 
Observations 666 555 518 481  703 666 592 
Year FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES            FE 
R-squared 0.746 0.957 0.957 0.958     
# of Country 37 37 37 37  37 37 37 
AR(1) P-value           0.304 0.304 0.048 
AR(2) P-value      0.399 0.277 0.818 
Over-Identification P-value     0.99 0.961 0.144 
# of instruments         32 31 29 
Standard errors in parentheses       




3.6.3. Effect of Tax Treaty on Tax Structure 
So far I have investigated whether double tax treaties signed between countries have any 
significant effect on total tax revenues of treaty partners using the weighted number of 
tax treaties signed in any given year as variable of interest. The fixed effect and dynamic 
SGMM estimations show a lasting positive and significant effect of weighted tax treaties 
on tax revenues starting from one year following the implementation of the tax treaty. I 
then tested for a diminishing effect par adding the squared tax treaty variable to my 
specifications. The results show that the diminishing effect sets in starting from the sixth 
year following the implementation of tax treaty.  
In this section, I propose to retest the results using the total tax revenues stemming 
from income, profits and capital gains as dependent variable instead of using the total tax 
revenues that include other tax sources. This new dependent variable seems more 
appropriate because it is reasonable to think that tax treaties will affect total tax revenue 
through their effects on taxes on income, profits and capital gains which represent the 
true target of tax treaties. The results reported on table 4 show that some control variables, 
GDP per capita and value added of industrial sector are still significant. Also, the FE 
estimation results are consistent with the findings when the total tax revenue was used as 
dependent variable. I note a positive and significant effect of weighted tax treaties on tax 
revenue in the third year following the implementation of tax treaty. The diminishing 
effect appears with lag five (row 2 of table 4). Overall the SGMM estimations do not 
appear to perform very well when using income tax revenue as dependent variable. One 
plausible reason might be that the same control variables are not pertinent in explaining 




these findings might be to use alternative source of tax treaties data such as the 




Table 3. 4 FE results with Income Tax revenue as dependent variable 
  FE Estimations   
logIncTaxLev(t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
(t-3) (t-5) (t-6) (t-7) (t-8)   
logIncTaxLev(t-1) 0.665*** 0.0545*** 0.651*** 0.634*** 0.596***  
 (0.00377) (0.0512) (0.0682) (0.0776) (0.0872)  
DTTsW 0.251*** 0.362** 0.242*** 0.227** 0.253**  
 (0.148) (0.183) (0.122) (0.155) (0.117)  
DTTsWsq -0.0310** -0.0721** -0.0537** -0.0416** -0.031**  
 (0.0328) (0.0286) (0.0320) (0.0158) (0.0326)  
logGDPpc05 0.379*** 0.943*** 0.367* 0.405* 0.468**  
 (0.133) (0.284) (0.189) (0.205) (0.226)  
logAGRI 0.128 -0.0954 -0.0421 -0.0523 -0.0637  
 (0.154) (0.102) (0.0624) (0.0682) (0.0787)  
logIND 0.328** 0.918*** 0.440** 0.505*** 0.603***  
 (0.155) (0.293) (0.167) (0.175) (0.186)  
logOPEN -0.172 -0.287 -0.0546 -0.0575 -0.0846  
 (0.123) (0.183) (0.124) (0.138) (0.153)  
Infl -0.00450 0.0263** 0.0120 0.0135 0.0596  
 (0.00510) (0.0106) (0.00773) (0.00852) (0.533)  
logPop 0.346** 0.911* 0.435** 0.562** 0.702***  
 (0.152) (0.506) (0.207) (0.215) (0.244)  
Constant -2.609 -6.040 -3.709 -5.105 -6.478  
 (1.456) (4.626) (1.823) (1.922) (2.221)  
Observations 663 589 552 515 478  
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES  
R-squared 0.747 0.875 0.929 0.927 0.924  
# of Country 37 37 37 37 37  
Standard errors in parentheses     







This paper investigates the effects of double tax treaties on tax revenues using a sample 
of 37 countries over the period 1990-2010. The paper is mainly motivated by the fact that 
the literature on double tax treaties generally claims that tax treaties are harmful to treaty 
partners especially when there is an asymmetry between countries in terms of flows of 
foreign direct investment. The fixed effect and system GMM estimation results reveal a 
bell shape relationship between tax revenue and tax treaties: a positive and significant 
effect coupled with a diminishing and significant effect of tax treaties on tax revenues. 
These findings caution tax treaty partners on the excessive use of double tax treaties as a 
means to attract foreign direct investment. This raises the question of the desirable 
number of tax treaties to conclude by different countries. Should countries sign more tax 
treaties or should they reduce the signing of double tax treaties? This question could be 
an interesting avenue for further research. Tax treaties are not homogeneous among 
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